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Kinetic energy weapons that contain a penetrator of depleted uranium (DU) were first used in the Gulf War of 1991 and were subsequently used in the Balkans. DU penetrators are considered to have significant operational advantages over those made of tungsten as they are capable of penetrating the heavy armour of the modern battle tank. The use of DU rounds in military conflicts has, however, provoked a wide debate about the health consequences for soldiers and the local population since DU is a toxic metal and is radioactive.

The Royal Society became involved in the debate about the health hazards of DU munitions as a result of public concern, to produce an independent view on the science and the uncertainties, uninfluenced by the conflicting interests of governments and the military, who consider that the risks are very slight, and of other individuals and organisations, some of whom have suggested that hundreds of thousands of deaths from cancer may result from the use of DU in the Gulf War.

Large quantities of DU rounds were deployed in the Gulf War (about 340 tonnes) and much smaller amounts in the Balkans (about 11 tonnes). In both conflicts the majority of the DU rounds were fired from aircraft in strafing attacks where most of the penetrators miss their target and penetrate several metres into the soil. Consequently, large numbers of DU penetrators are believed to remain buried in the ground. Corrosion of these penetrators will occur with the possibility of a gradual rise in the uranium levels in local water supplies. About 10,000 larger calibre DU rounds were fired from tanks during the Gulf War, although these were not used in the Balkans. DU rounds that penetrate a target vehicle may pass straight through or, particularly if they hit heavy armour, may release a variable proportion of the penetrator as DU particles which ignite to produce an aerosol of DU oxides. The DU particles released during such impacts will be inhaled by those surviving within a struck tank or by those in the path of the DU aerosol. Unless adequate respiratory protection is used, DU particles will also be inhaled by those charged with cleaning up DU-contaminated vehicles. The fraction of a DU penetrator that is aerosolised and the fraction of the particles of DU oxides that are within the respirable range, as well as the solubility properties of the DU oxides, are not well documented and depend on the type of impact, but a range of values is available from test firings of DU rounds.

A number of exposure scenarios were considered in the two Royal Society reports on the Health Hazards of DU Munitions [1, 2] and central and worst-case intakes of DU were estimated from the range of values obtained from test firings. These estimated intakes, and the range of reported values of the properties of the DU oxides released during an impact or fire, were used to produce central estimates and worst-case estimates of risks for soldiers on the battlefield. Although there are uncertainties about the intakes of DU, and of the properties of the DU oxides, there is a clear view among radiation biologists that, given the equivalent doses to tissues, the excess lifetime risks of various fatal cancers can be estimated, perhaps with an order of magnitude of uncertainty. Therefore if the intakes of DU, or the properties of DU oxides, are in future better defined, the estimates of risk given in the Royal Society reports can be adjusted appropriately.

There are very different views on the health hazards of DU munitions. Most of the concerns of veterans and their advisors focus on the radiological effects of DU and consequently these are the focus of this editorial. Effects on the kidney and environmental consequences are, however, considered in the second of the Royal Society reports [2] and the main conclusions of both of the reports are outlined in the summary document published in this issue of the journal (page 131). The main radiological concerns focus on the irradiation of lung tissues from inhaled DU particles and irradiation resulting from the translocation of inhaled particles to the thoracic lymph nodes. DU shrapnel is also a concern and the health of a group of US soldiers with retained shrapnel is being carefully monitored, with little signs so far of adverse health effects. However, soft tissue sarcomas have recently been reported around DU pellets implanted in the muscles of rats [3] and long-term monitoring of these soldiers is required. The overwhelming scientific view, presented in the two Royal Society reports and in other independent reviews, is that the main risks of exposure to DU aerosols are an increase in lung cancer and (from chemical toxicity) damage to the kidney, although these are likely to be evident only following substantial intakes. The equivalent doses to the thoracic lymph nodes following inhalation of DU particles are about ten times greater than those to the lung, but the former tissue is considered to be relatively insensitive to radiation-induced cancers [4].

Excepting lung cancer in a few soldiers who could be very heavily exposed to DU, any increases in other cancers, including lymphomas and leukaemias, are predicted to be too small to be detected, unless the intakes for large numbers of soldiers on the battlefield are very much greater than estimated, or the ICRP models greatly under-estimate the risks of inhaled particles of DU oxides. Some advisors to the veterans groups take the latter position, and argue that the alpha-particles from highly insoluble DU particles translocated to the thoracic lymph nodes are much more dangerous than implied by ICRP models, and that the risks of leukaemias and lymphomas are greatly under-estimated. These views are familiar to those who have followed the debate about leukaemia clusters and `hot particles' in discharges from the nuclear industry or increased leukaemias from the accident at Chernobyl. DU particles can hardly be called `hot' but large intakes of DU by a few soldiers working for protracted periods cleaning up contaminated vehicles without any respiratory protection, or survivors of struck tanks, could, under worst-case assumptions, result in large numbers of DU particles in the thoracic lymph nodes, providing doses of up to about 5 Gy over a 50 year period [1]. However, very much smaller doses are predicted for the great majority of soldiers on the battlefield and for those returning to live in the region.

It is therefore unlikely from current scientific knowledge that there will be any detectable increase in any cancers, except perhaps lung cancer if small groups of soldiers were exposed to large amounts of DU. This conclusion has been difficult to accept for some veterans and their advisors, who are searching for a cause of the illnesses in the veterans (including Gulf War Syndrome), and who suggest that large numbers of cancers and birth defects are being seen, for example in Iraq, and who criticise the use of models to estimate cancer risks. Such critics of ICRP models believe that cancer incidence data rather than models should be used to produce the estimates of risks. Of course they are correct. Ideally, risks of cancers should be determined from the excess mortality in a population exposed to known levels of radiation, but this approach is very rarely possible as exposures are typically too low. Data from the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki provide a major source of the data that underpin ICRP models but critics argue that this type of radiation exposure is so different from the internal exposures to alpha-emitting radionuclides that result from inhalation intakes of DU, or from `hot particles' from nuclear power plants, that they invalidate the use of ICRP models for estimating risks for the latter type of exposures. Risks from internal exposures to alpha-particles have been obtained from underground miners exposed to radon, since the number of exposed miners, and the excess mortality from lung cancer, are large enough to make robust measures of risk. These direct measurements of risk from internal exposures agree rather well with those from IRCP models [5, 6]. In fact the modelling approach may over-estimate the risk to the lung.

This agreement between ICRP models and direct measures of risks to the lung from internal exposure to alpha-emitting radionuclides tends to be ignored by critics of ICRP models who focus largely on increased risks of lymphomas and leukaemias from radioactive particles in the thoracic lymph nodes. The risks of lymphomas and leukaemias from inhaled alpha-emitting particles have been proposed by some to be more than 100-fold under-estimated by ICRP models [7]. However, this extreme conclusion has been proposed on the basis of highly controversial data on leukaemia clusters around nuclear facilities, or leukaemia rates following the Chernobyl accident, or a small numbers of cases of leukaemia in Italian soldiers who served in the Balkans. Any major shift in the current consensus scientific view of the risks of cancers from inhaled radioactive particles must be derived from robust epidemiological data. Epidemiological studies and their interpretation are fraught with difficulties and, unless the data are generally considered to be robust, and the conclusions from the data are broadly accepted, it is very unwise to adjust the risks obtained from ICRP models. However, we also need to be open-minded and to listen to, engage, and vigorously challenge where necessary, those whose views on radiation risks are heterodox.

The substantial literature on the mortality of workers in the uranium industry shows little evidence for any substantial increase in overall mortality or deaths from all cancers, or from specific cancers, among those working with uranium, except for underground miners where excess lung cancers are attributed to exposure to radon [1, 5]. Can we use this large body of epidemiological data to put some limits on the radiological risks of exposure to DU aerosols, or are the intakes of DU on the battlefield significantly different from those that occur in the uranium industry? There are clearly some important differences; inhalation exposure to pure DU oxide particles is very different to inhalation exposure to ores which contain a low proportion of uranium, but exposures to pure uranium oxides that are similar to those that occur following the military use of DU do occur in some parts of the uranium industry. However, it is very difficult to relate the chronic exposures that occurred in the early days of the uranium industry with those that could occur on the battlefield and it is unclear how much comfort we should take from the lack of a clear excess mortality or excess cancers from studies of uranium workers. However, they do seem to indicate that exposure to uranium in industrial settings has not led to any major increased risks of cancer. Mainstream scientific opinion therefore argues that there is little evidence of excess cancers among workers in the uranium industry, and little evidence from other groups exposed to internal doses of alpha-emitting radionuclides, or from animal studies with inhaled alpha-emitting radionuclides, to indicate that the estimates of cancer risks from inhaled DU particles produced by ICRP models are likely to be seriously in error [8, 9]. The suggestion that some cancer risks from inhaled alpha-emitting particles are more than 100-fold under-estimated by ICRP models is difficult to reconcile with the studies of uranium workers, where a greater than 100-fold under-estimation of risk ought to lead to an obvious excess of leukaemias or lymphomas in these large epidemiological studies.

Are there any features of DU that could lead to a risk of cancer that is greater than expected from ICRP models? One possibility that has emerged from recent studies with a human osteosarcoma cell line is that uranium may also be chemically carcinogenic [10]. Increased levels of soluble uranium in cells around DU particles in lymph nodes, or around retained DU shrapnel, could enhance the radiological effects from the alpha-particles. At present there is no evidence that this occurs, and presumably if there are synergistic interactions between chemical and radiological effects, these would also occur in the uranium workers exposed to inhaled uranium oxide particles where clearly increased mortality from cancers are not observed.

How do we move forward? Perhaps the greatest knowledge gap is the extent of exposure to DU that occurs on the battlefield. Almost no measurements of uranium isotopes in urine have been made in veterans of the Gulf War or Balkans conflicts. This is unfortunate as reliable measures of uranium isotopes in urine would identify any soldiers who have been exposed to substantial intakes of DU and could lead to more sensitive epidemiological studies to establish if there are any links between DU exposure and ill health. Those few measurements of uranium isotopes that have been made give contradictory results. Thus, DU has been detected in some residents of Kosovo (data from Nick Priest), and in some UK and Canadian Gulf War veterans (data from Pat Horan), but DU has not been detected in hair or bone from other Canadian veterans from the Gulf War or from Kosovo [11]. Few laboratories have sufficient expertise in measuring uranium isotopes in urine containing small amounts of uranium and the reliability of some of these measurements has been questioned. The Ministry of Defence DU Oversight Board, which includes representatives from veterans groups and their advisors, is currently assessing the ability of a number of independent laboratories to achieve reliable and accurate measurements of DU in urine, which can then be used to look at levels of DU in the urine of veterans. It is hoped that a validated test will be available to veterans by the end of the year. Reliable validated measures of DU in urine will allow concerned veterans from the Gulf War and Kosovo to know if they have been exposed to substantial intakes of DU. If the tests are sufficiently sensitive it should be possible to detect inhalation intakes during the Gulf War of about 25 mg of DU (and lower intakes from the more recent Balkans conflicts). If this sensitivity is achieved in a fully validated test, veterans in which no DU is detected should have no health concerns from possible exposures to DU. Those that have measurable levels of DU in urine need to get the best possible scientific advice about any health implications from their estimated level of exposure, from scientists who do not have political reasons to underplay or overplay the risks of their exposure.

The Royal Society Working Group were unconvinced by the data used to support a much higher cancer risk from inhaled DU particles than that suggested by ICRP models, but a rational scientific debate about the risks from exposure of the thoracic lymph nodes to radiation is appropriate and the Royal Society recommended a thorough review by an independent expert group of the available data and the uncertainties.

Independent studies to evaluate the reports of increased cancers and birth defects in Iraq and the Balkans are also required, although these are dependent on high quality longitudinal data, which may not be available. It is well known that increased awareness of possible health concerns can lead to increased reporting of the relevant conditions and careful independent studies need to be carried out. So far, large-scale epidemiological studies of UK and US Gulf War veterans have shown no increase in mortality from cancer, or kidney disease, but these studies need to be continued to see if any significant excess mortality from these causes appears. As mentioned previously, more sensitive epidemiological studies should be possible if groups of soldiers who have known exposures to DU can be identified.

Adverse reproductive effects have been observed in rodents exposed to uranium [12] although most of these effects are evident after relatively large daily intakes of uranium. The possibility of effects on reproductive health (from DU or other toxic exposures) is being studied in both UK and US Gulf War veterans. Results from the UK epidemiological study are not yet available but self-reported birth defects were significantly increased in US Gulf War Veterans compared to a control group [13]. Such studies are subject to reporting bias and confirmation of these results using medical records is required.

Finally, there are multiple toxic, or potentially toxic, exposures in modern warfare (particularly during the Gulf War), and the Iraqi population has also been exposed to chemical agents. Thus, even if clear excesses of cancers or birth defects are established, it will be difficult to link them to DU, to any of the other exposures, or to some combination of toxic exposures. However, a clear independent scientific view on whether there are any excesses is a necessary first stage.

There has been a substantial amount of public discussion on the health effects of the use of depleted uranium (DU) munitions. In response to this concern the Royal Society set up an independent, expert working group to investigate the health effects of DU munitions. The Royal Society has now produced two reports, and this summary covering the key conclusions and recommendations from both reports. The part I report considered the increased risks of radiation-induced cancer from exposures to DU on the battlefield. Part II dealt with the risks from the chemical toxicity of uranium, non-malignant radiation effects from DU intakes, the long-term environmental consequences of the deployment of DU munitions and responses to part I including issues arising at a public meeting to discuss the part I report.

Cohen's ecological analysis of US lung cancer mortality rates and mean county radon concentration shows decreasing mortality rates with increasing radon concentration (Cohen 1995 Health Phys. 68 157-74). The results prompted his rejection of the linear-no-threshold (LNT) model for radon and lung cancer. Although several authors have demonstrated that risk patterns in ecological analyses provide no inferential value for assessment of risk to individuals, Cohen advances two arguments in a recent response to Darby and Doll (2000 J. Radiol. Prot. 20 221-2) who suggest Cohen's results are and will always be burdened by the ecological fallacy. Cohen asserts that the ecological fallacy does not apply when testing the LNT model, for which average exposure determines average risk, and that the influence of confounding factors is obviated by the use of large numbers of stratification variables. These assertions are erroneous. Average dose determines average risk only for models which are linear in all covariates, in which case ecological analyses are valid. However, lung cancer risk and radon exposure, while linear in the relative risk, are not linearly related to the scale of absolute risk, and thus Cohen's rejection of the LNT model is based on a false premise of linearity. In addition, it is demonstrated that the deleterious association for radon and lung cancer observed in residential and miner studies is consistent with negative trends from ecological studies, of the type described by Cohen.

Last year the ICRP proposed a new system of radiation protection designed to be simpler, more oriented toward individual protection and reflective of important ethical standards. This article argues that the proposal violates important norms of scientific simplicity, is in fact less protective of individuals than the current system and makes a number of ethical errors. After outlining 12 ethical errors, five logical errors and two scientific problems with the new ICRP proposal, the present authors suggest possible ways to remedy these deficiencies.

Current ICRP policy in radiological protection (ICRP Publication 60) is based on the independent restriction of exposure and sources for practice and intervention. Such subdivision of exposure and sources leads to a number of problems and contradictions in different applications. In a recent memorandum of the ICRP, published in the Journal of Radiological Protection in 2001, and ICRP Publications 81 and 82, the directions for settling some of these problems are indicated. This paper shows that in Ukraine, after the Chernobyl accident, a number of problems and contradictions occurred as the result of strictly separated limitation of the sources and exposure. These are demonstrated through four `radiological paradoxes': (1) resettlement of inhabitants from territories radioactively contaminated after the Chernobyl accident to `clean' ones, but with anomalous high levels of radon exposure in houses; (2) necessity of summation of the Chernobyl accidental doses and doses caused by normally operating nuclear power plant (NPP) to meet the requirements of Ukrainian law, which is based on the principle of `social equity' of different sources of exposure; (3) the necessity to answer the question of primary importance: when will the Chernobyl accident finally end and when can exposure from contaminated territories be considered as exposure from old contamination? (4) the start of decommissioning of the Chernobyl NPP and transformation of the `Object Shelter' (located inside the exclusion zone) are now slowed down because of the absence of a definite ideology for dose limitation of workers involved, who are exposed to several types of source simultaneously. The authors believe that the concept of controllable dose as presented by Professor Roger H Clarke on behalf of the ICRP can resolve such paradoxes. The changes to ICRP policy need to be made carefully in order to provide an orderly transition.

The energy response of three types of LiF:Mg, Ti dosemeter to standard x-ray calibration qualities and diagnostic x-rays has been studied. The aim of this study was to investigate whether the inherent mismatch between these qualities compromises the accuracy of the evaluated occupational doses in diagnostic x-ray facilities. A sample of 10 dosemeters of each type was exposed to air kerma of 5 mGy from each of six ISO 4037 (series 407) x-ray radiation protection calibration qualities (2.7 mm Al to 2.45 mm Cu HVL (half-value layer)) and 11 diagnostic x-ray qualities (1.45-4.9 mm Al HVL). The results show that the TLD energy response to ISO 4037 and diagnostic x-rays as normalised to ¹³⁷Cs ranged from 1.1 to 1.44 and 0.57 to 1.54 respectively. This implies an energy response range from -52 to + 7% for diagnostic x-rays relative to ISO 4037 x-rays, hence a maximum over-response of 52%. Despite this discrepancy, the results show that the mismatch between calibration and diagnostic x-ray beams does not significantly compromise the accuracy of individual doses in diagnostic x-ray facilities.

Dear Sir

I was interested to read in the December issue the article by Greaves and Tindale (2001 J. Radiol. Prot.21 381–92) on the care of a helpless patient and the handling of the radioactive corpse. I was involved in a similar situation in the late 1940s, soon after I-131 became available in therapeutic quantities. We had to deal with similar problems, but there were a further two not mentioned by Greaves and Tindale. Unfortunately, having retired 23 years ago, I no longer have written records of this, and must therefore rely on my memory of events of over half a century ago. Those were the days when there were no Ionising Radiation Regulations, and, I think, even no official guidance on the body content of radioiodine at which a patient could safely be discharged. We were on our own.

When the undertaker heard that radioactive material was involved, he showed that he knew something about the subject by demanding that the relatives provide a lining to the coffin of at least 1/4 inch of lead. We did the calculations and doubted whether he could find six men to lift such a coffin, and, even if this were possible, whether the weight would be much more of a hazard than the radioiodine—provided his men did not carry the coffin for more than 45 minutes. He agreed to this compromise, but I have often wondered whether that coffin was carried at the double, just to be sure.

We understood at the outset that the patient was a Jewess, although this turned out to be untrue. Feeling that we should be as sensitive as possible to any religious practices that distressed relatives might request, we made inquiries and were told that `last offices' would need to be carried out by the Rabbi, on his own. This would have made things rather difficult if only because the professional training of a Rabbi includes no more on radiation protection than does that of a medical physicist on theology. Fortunately the need for dealing with such a situation did not arise, but we did give some thought as to what might happen if such a patient had belonged to any one of the many religions to be found in Britain even in those days. For example, as far as my memory can recall, a Hindu would request that a cremation be carried out very quickly. For a Moslem any post-mortem or similar surgical intervention would require the prior agreement of the Imam. A Christian Scientist would expect that a relative would be watching at the bedside of the patient until the death. In order to clear ourselves in the event of such a situation arising, we presented a report to the hospital administrators, who agreed that our policy should be to be sensitive to any request from the relatives as to their preferred religious practices, and accede to any such request unless this were to involve quite serious radiation hazards. In this case we would have the backing of the hospital in making such other arrangements as we thought most satisfactory.

Yours faithfully,

Dear Sir

We thank Dr Osborn for his interest in our paper and for his enlightening and thought-provoking letter. We would like to offer the following comments.

The half value thickness for lead for I-131 is 2.6 mm. A coffin lined with this thickness lead would have the effect of reducing the dose to the men carrying the coffin by one half. The weight of the coffin would indeed be considerable. Lead lining for a box 170 cm × 50 cm × 40 cm would weigh more than 1000 kg without allowing for the weight of the coffin and the corpse. I doubt that carrying such a coffin would fit with many manual handling policies.

An alternative to lining the coffin would be to allow the radioiodine to decay. A delay of 8 days would have the same effect as 2.6 mm of lead. The draft Medical and Dental Guidance Notes (MDGN) [1] advise that burial and cremation can take place with activities of radioiodine in the corpse of up to 400 MBq. Embalming should not be carried out within the period covered by an instruction card or within 48 hours of administration of the radioiodine. If the activity in the corpse is greater than 400 MBq, it may still be possible to bury or cremate the body but advice should be sought from the Radiation Protection Advisor (RPA). In our case the activity in the corpse was 400 MBq, so a request for burial would not have caused a problem. For a patient given an ablation therapy of up to 7.4 GBq of radioiodine the situation would not be so straightforward.

In determining what precautions to take with regard to contact with the patient, a risk assessment should be performed. Using published data [2], the dose rate for the administered activity can be calculated. Using this dose rate together with the predicted times a person might spend at various distances from the patient, a reasonable estimate of the dose can be calculated and systems of work introduced to protect friends, relatives, priests, rabbis, etc. In our case, a priest who spent 30 minutes at a distance of 0.1 m from the patient would have received approximately 0.1 mSv. Although generic guidelines can be drawn up, it is likely that advice will be sought on an individual basis.

Relatives or friends of the patient who are acting in a supporting role can be classed as `comforters and carers'. They are not subject to dose limits but should be fully informed about the radiation risks and willing to incur the exposure they will receive. Advice should be given to restrict their exposure so that it is as low as reasonably practicable. A generic dose constraint of 5 mSv has been recommended. In our case, the carer could have spent 2 hours per day at 0.1 m, 10 hours per day at 0.5 m, and 12 hours per day at 1.0 m over the 3 days between administration and death without exceeding 5 mSv. Again for a patient given an ablation therapy, the potential dose to a relative would be much higher.

The death of a relative obviously causes distress for relatives and the situation needs to be handled sensitively. In situations where the corpse contains levels of activity greater than those outlined in the MDGN it may still be possible to perform burial, cremation, embalming or a post-mortem examination. The RPA (for the department administering the dose) should be contacted for advice. It may be possible to introduce systems of work to limit exposure and potential contamination.

Yours faithfully,

Professor Edward Radford, who died suddenly, aged 79, on October 12th last year at his home, was probably best known in the UK as Chairman of the Biological Effects of Ionising Radiation Committee III (BEIR) of the US National Academy of Sciences which initially reported in 1979. The 21 member committee were seriously split over their conclusions about the risk of radiation exposure, with Radford outspoken in his support of the highest estimate. Feelings of apprehension were running high in the US at the time because of the Three Mile Island accident. Eventually the Academy withdrew the initial report and a bitter controversy ensued which resulted in several acrimonious publications. Radford's rejection of any sanitisation of the risk, with a Chairman's dissenting statement, did not endear him to the nuclear establishment but his tough stance earned him respect internationally and set the scene for his subsequent work as a consultant and expert witness in numerous court cases.

Ed was born in Springfield, Massachusetts in 1922 and proceeded from studying biology at MIT to a medical degree from Harvard as a National Scholar. His interest in radiation health studies began during military service when he was involved in the Marshall Islands A-bomb tests and returned full circle near the end of his career as a consultant to the Nuclear Claims Tribunal. In 1949 he went back to Harvard Medical School to do research into respiratory physiology and developed a nomogram to help with the artificial respiration of patients with poliomyelitis. However, his interest in radiobiology flourished when he joined the Harvard School of Public Heath in 1952 and produced their first teaching module on radiation health effects.

In the early 1960s his research with Vilma Hunt into natural radioactivity in cigarettes began and he identified polonium-210 as a possible co-carcinogen in cigarette smoke. This work continued when he moved, in 1965, to Ohio as Director of the Department of Environmental Health and Kettering Laboratory and professor of physiology in the College of Medicine at the University of Cincinnati, and subsequently as professor of environmental medicine at John Hopkin's University School of Hygiene and Public Health. It was a logical step for him to develop an interest in the effects of inhaled radon, particularly in miners, and this he pursued enthusiastically when he was appointed as Director of the Centre for Environmental Epidemiology at the University of Pittsburgh in 1977. His international reputation was by then established and he was appointed to chair the BEIR III Committee and later was a member from 1981 to 1995 of the Three Mile Island Public Health Fund Advisory Committee which supported research into the effects of low-level radiation.

In 1975–1976 Radford spent a sabbatical with Sir Richard Doll at Oxford and he returned by invitation to present some evidence at the THORP inquiry. He became well known in the UK as a compassionate, expert witness on behalf of claimants against the nuclear industry and MoD. After his `retirement' from full time academic work in 1983, Radford redoubled his efforts on behalf of claimants and also spent some time in Japan as a visiting scientist at the RERF and as a visiting professor at the University of Occupational and Environmental Health at Kitakyushu. Even in the 1990s when he was in his seventies Ed was seemingly tireless in litigation cases both in the US and the UK.

Ed Radford was a gentle man and a scientist, but was vociferous and stubborn in defence of his principles which were recognised and respected the world over. In 1983 Ed married, for the third time, to an English occupational health consultant, Jennifer Barnard, and in 1986 they moved to England, initially to the Cotswolds, then to Woking and subsequently to Haslemere in 2000. Just before his death he completed a book about his professional experiences which should provide fascinating reading.

The text (including tables) of this news item is given in the PDF file below.

After the publication of the Interim Report on Dose Estimation for Three Victims of JCO Accident in Japanese in March 2000, additional investigations including the measurements of activities in bones, computer simulation, and ESR of teeth samples were carried out to improve the dose estimation. The Japanese version of the final report was published in February (NIRS-M-153, ISBN 4-938987-13-9) and distributed to relevant institutions and scientists. The English version was published in April 2002. Those who wish to obtain a copy of the report (free of charge) can do so by sending an e-mail to Kenzo Fujimoto's secretary (naokoiso@nirs.go.jp).

The membership of the Committee Examining Radiation Risks of Internal Emitters (CERRIE), set up under the auspices of the Committee on the Medical Aspects of Radiation in the Environment (COMARE), has recently been finalised and is given below.

Chairman

Professor Dudley Goodhead, MRC Radiation and Genome Stability Unit

Members

Mr Richard Bramhall, The Low Level Radiation Campaign Dr Chris Busby, Green Audit Dr Roger Cox, National Radiological Protection Board Dr Philip Day, University of Manchester Professor Sarah Darby, ICRF Cancer Epidemiology Unit, University of Oxford Dr John Harrison, National Radiological Protection Board Dr Colin Muirhead, National Radiological Protection Board Mr Pete Roche, Greenpeace UK Professor Jack Simmons, University of Westminster Dr Richard Wakeford, British Nuclear Fuels Ltd Professor Eric Wright, Ninewells Medical School, Dundee.

The Chairman of COMARE, Professor Bryn Bridges, will attend the meetings as an observer, as will officials from the Department of Health and DEFRA.

CERRIE is a working group of COMARE. CERRIE has been given the remit `to consider the present risk models for radiation and health that apply to exposure to radiation from internal radionuclides in the light of recent studies and any further research that might be needed'. CERRIE will prepare a report for COMARE, which will be published. COMARE will then advise Ministers on the need for changes to the existing risk models and for further work. Each of the members of CERRIE has been appointed because of their knowledge and experience of the issues under discussion. They have joint responsibility to evaluate thoroughly the existing evidence and make recommendations, in line with the Committee's remit.

In order to facilitate the free flow of views during Committee meetings, CERRIE has decided that its work would be best carried out under the `Chatham House Rule'. This approach will allow ideas/information raised in meetings to be discussed outside them, but the anonymity of their authors would be retained so that they will not be inhibited from developing and changing their views later on. In order to be transparent about their discussions, the members of CERRIE are preparing their own website which will include, among other things, summary minutes of their meetings. During and after the period of the Committee's deliberations and preparation of its report, members will be free to publish technical papers that they have prepared to inform the Committee, but the views expressed in them should be clearly attributable to the individual and should not imply that they reflect the views of the Committee collectively.

The results of a survey into the frequency of medical and dental x-ray examinations in the UK and contemporary data on the radiation doses typically received by patients have been used to assess trends in the extent and pattern of population exposure in a new NRPB report. Individual patient doses, expressed in terms of the effective dose, range from a few microsieverts (µSv) for simple radiographic examinations of the teeth, limbs or chest to tens of millisieverts (mSv) for prolonged fluoroscopic procedures or some computed tomography (CT) examinations.

A total of about 41.5 million x-ray examinations are now conducted each year (0.7 examinations per head of population). This results in an annual per caput effective dose of 330 µSv, which is not significantly different from the estimated figure in the early 1990s. However, over the last ten years, CT has more than doubled its contribution and is now responsible for 40% of the total dose to the population from medical x-rays (despite being only 4% of the total number of examinations). In contrast, the contribution to dose from conventional radiographic and fluoroscopic examinations has nearly halved to about 44%.

The annual per caput dose of 330 µSv is low in comparison with other countries having similarly developed systems of healthcare. This is due to both a lower frequency of x-ray examinations per head of population and generally lower doses in the UK than in other developed countries. However, the much increased contribution of CT, angiography and interventional procedures to the UK population dose indicates an urgent need to develop radiation protection and optimisation activities for these high-dose procedures to the same level as has been achieved for conventional radiology.

It is hoped that this publication will provide useful guidance on where best to concentrate efforts on patient dose reduction in order to optimise the protection of the population in a cost-effective manner. This publication is available on the NRPB website (www.nrpb.org/press).

The current main NRPB advice on electromagnetic field exposure guidelines was issued in 1992 (Documents of the NRPB4 (3)). NRPB is now reviewing the scientific basis for EMF exposure guidelines. The terms of reference are:

• To produce a comprehensive assessment of the science covering the areas of biology, epidemiology and dosimetry and provide guidance on limiting exposure of people to electromagnetic fields in the range of 0 Hz to 300 GHz.

•To consider where information may be lacking, discuss any need to invoke a precautionary approach and what that might be.

A consultative document is expected later in 2002.

ICNIRP has also issued exposure guidelines for electromagnetic fields, principally in 1998 (Health Physics74 (4) 494–522). It has now published a paper giving the general approach to protection against non-ionising radiation which underlies its guidelines (2002 Health Physics82 (4) 540–8). Amongst other things, this spells out that:

• The adoption of a complete system of protection involves social, economic and political considerations as well as the scientific issues considered by ICNIRP, and these are matters for national governments rather than ICNIRP.

• Similarly, ICNIRP provides information either on the threshold for an adverse health effect or on the consequences for health of various levels of exposure. The acceptability of such risks falls outside the remit of ICNIRP.

• ICNIRP bases exposure guidelines only on effects which are judged to be well established. ICNIRP recognises a number of approaches to risk management of suspected (but not established) adverse health effects, but it differentiates these from `science based exposure guidelines'.

• Uncertainties in knowledge about adverse effects of exposure are compensated for by reduction factors, and the guidelines will accordingly be set below the thresholds of critical effects.

One of the key recommendations of the Stewart Report on Mobile Phones and Health was for a programme of new research supported equally by Government and Industry. This recommendation was accepted with an initial £7.4 million being allocated for the programme. An international committee of experts, chaired by Sir William Stewart, was set in place to allocate and manage the programme.

On 25 January the committee announced the first fifteen projects to receive funding at a cost of around £4.5 million.

• Two studies will examine possible effects on blood pressure and hearing in volunteers.

• Four studies will investigate whether the use of mobile phones can affect the risk of developing brain cancer or leukaemia by studying mobile phone users.

• Two studies will investigate the effects of mobile phone signals on brain function, and the behaviour of exposed people.

• One study will investigate ways in which mobile phones affect the performance of drivers.

• Two studies will try to identify how mobile phone signals could produce biological effects by looking for evidence of changes in exposed cells.

• Four studies will examine the interaction of radio signals with the body in order to characterise how much energy is deposited and where.

Details of the projects can be found at (http://www.mthr.org.uk). A second call for research proposals was announced in December 2001 and they will be evaluated shortly.

Since 1 April 2002 the National Care Standards Commission has been responsible for the registration of lasers and `intense light sources' used in private healthcare, under the Private and Voluntary Health Care (England) Regulations 2001 (http://www.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2001/20013968.htm). The IPEM Ultrasound and Non-Ionising Scientific Interest Group (UNIRSIG) provided input to the DoH consultation process through a working party, and will provide guidance to scientists, such as Laser Protection Advisers concerned with the use of such lasers. Indeed, the guidance document is nearing completion and should be published in the May edition of the IPEM Newsletter. It will also be posted on the medical physics, SRP and British Medical Laser Association (BMLA) mailbases.

Thomas S Tenforde, PhD, was elected President of the NCRP by the Council membership at the business meeting on April 11, 2002. Dr Tenforde is the fourth president since the Council was chartered in 1964, preceded by: Charles B Meinhold, 1991 to 2002; Warren K Sinclair, 1977 to 1991; and Lauriston S Taylor, 1964 to 1977. Dr Taylor was also chairman of NCRP's predecessor organisations from 1929 to 1964.

Dr Tenforde comes to the NCRP from his position as a Senior Chief Scientist in the Environmental Technology Division at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, a US Department of Energy national laboratory located in Richland, Washington. Dr Tenforde has a BA in physics from Harvard University and a PhD in biophysics from the University of California, Berkeley. Dr Tenforde and his wife Susan have two sons, undergraduate students at Stanford University and the University of Washington. Dr Tenforde will reside in Bethesda, Maryland.

Elected to the Council

David T Bartlett Jerrold T Bushberg John F Cardella Mary E Clark Paul M DeLuca John R Frazier Thomas F Gesell John W Hirshfeld Barbara J McNeil William F Morgan Bruce A Napier Carl J Paperiello Henry D. Royal Jonathan M Samet Roy E Shore Daniel J Strom Thomas S Tenforde

Elected to Honorary Membership

President Emeritus: Charles B Meinhold Honorary Vice President: S James Adelstein Hymer Friedell Honorary Member: Lynn R Anspaugh Keith F Eckerman Roger O McClellan John W Poston, Sr John E Till

Elected to Board of Directors

Amy Kronenberg Jill Lipoti Ronald C Petersen R Julian Preston Henry D Royal Michael T Ryan Richard J Vetter Susan D Wiltshire Marvin C Ziskin (The President and Vice President are automatically members of the Board of Directors)

Elected as Officers

President: Thomas S Tenforde Vice President: Kenneth R Kase Secretary/Treasurer: William M Beckner Assistant Secretary: Michael F McBride

Appointed to the Nominating Committee by the Board of Directors

Richard J Vetter, Chairman Paul M DeLuca Stephen A Feig Amy Kronenberg Paul Slovic

Appointed to the Budget and Finance Committee by the Board of Directors

Henry D Royal, Chairman Benjamin R Archer C Douglas Maynard Michael T Ryan Stephen M Seltzer

Documents of the NRPB New document on UVR (http://www.nrpb.org.uk/publications/documents_of_nrpb/abstracts/absd13-1.htm)

Reports The first W series report (http://www.nrpb.org.uk/publications/w_series_reports/2002/nrpb_w1.htm)

Additions/developments to NRPB website

New pages on the Advisory Groups (http://www.nrpb.org/about_us/index.htm)

Annual reports of ADMLC for 1999/2000 and 2000/2001 (http://www.nrpb.org/publications/w_series_reports/2002/nrpb_w2.htm and (http://www.nrpb.org/publications/w_series_reports/2002/nrpb_w3.htm )

New poster published for National Science Week—Sunsense: Protecting Yourself from Ultraviolet Radiation (UVR) (http://www.nrpb.org/publications/educational/posters/uv_poster.pdf)

Minutes of the Audit Committee meeting of 27 February and Board meeting of 28 February (http://www.nrpb.org/about_us/the_board/minutes_of_meetings/index.htm)

New specialist module for the Radiological Protection Training Scheme (http://www.nrpb.org/services/training/professional/rpts/radioactive_waste.htm)

Information on a recent Royal Society report on depleted uranium (http://www.nrpb.org/publications/misc_publications/royal_society_report_on_du.htm)

Articles

Covering techniques for severe burn treatment: lessons for radiological burn accidents H Carsin, J Stéphanazzi, F Lambert, P-M Curet and P Gourmelon

The cytogenetics biodosimetry of accidental overexposure P Voisin, M Benderitter, V Chambrette, M Claraz, M Delbos, V Durand, N Paillole, L Roy and I Sorokine-Durm

Status report on standard-setting work in the area of environmental measurement of radionuclides D Calmet, Y Bourlat, M Desprès, N Lemaitre, F Levy, M C Robé, J P Kancellary and P Diakonoff

Campaign to gather medical devices containing radium: results J P Pierre, J P Vidal, J C Martin and J L Pasquier

I was taken aback and greatly honoured to be invited to stand for President-elect of the SRP last year. In the year which will celebrate the 40th Anniversary of the Society I will try to be an able President.

The Society has moved a long way from its beginnings and continues to adapt to present circumstances. In earlier days its strengths lay in providing a broad spectrum of scientific meetings at which members and non-members could gain a broad insight into radiological protection matters and could exchange information informally at coffee breaks, etc. Disseminating information (through meetings of all sorts, the Journal, the newsletter and the website) and facilitating interactions (through personal contacts, the e-group, etc) are still key roles of the Society.

The Society cannot be all things to all people, but it should be an inclusive society catering for all those with an interest in radiological protection and allied fields. It has been tarred with favouring the nuclear industry at the expense of other areas of radiological protection. I believe that this is not deserved but would welcome any constructive comments. I will encourage liaison with other societies with an interest in radiological protection.

In recent years the Society has move towards individuals gaining formal recognition and qualifications. The CPD scheme and certification for RPAs and specialists, through RPA2000, are well established. The SRP is active in developing NVQs in radiation protection. Council is investigating the possibility of Chartered Status and there will be developments shortly. JRP has moved from strength to strength over the years and is now a well-respected international journal.

Are we too inward looking? By their nature many in our profession are diffident about selling themselves and their profession. I support moves to educate the public, government and the media on radiation safety and to make informed comment where appropriate. I look forward to an interesting year as President.

President M Marshall

President Elect J R Croft

Past President M C Thorne

Hon Secretary P E Powell

Hon Treasurer R Hannan

Non-Voting Members J H Jackson (Chairman, Membership Committee) C Partington (Chairman, Qualifications and Professional Standards committee) C A Perks (Scientific Programme Secretary) R Wakeford (Journal Editor)

Council Members A M Bandle R H Corbett S H Evans C Griffiths S Khan (Associate Representative) M S Ramsay G C R Sallit (Affiliate Representative) B D Smith

Margaret Minski

Margaret Jane Minski was born in London, within the sound of Bow Bells as it happens, which makes her officially a cockney! Her education progressed from Sutton High School to King's College London where she obtained a first class honours BSc in 1959 in Chemistry and Physics with Pure Mathematics as an ancillary subject in the first year.

Her first post was with the Laboratory of the Government Chemist, where she developed methods of analysis for elements in British Standards. Then, from 1960 to 1972, Margaret was a scientist with the Medical Research Council (MRC) at the National Radiological Protection Board at Belmont, Surrey. Here her research included theoretical dose calculations to humans from ingestion and injection of radionuclides, analysis of tissues for sulphur and the investigation of sulphur metabolism in rats using radioactive tracers with a view to extrapolating to man for more accurate estimates of radiation doses. Techniques were developed for measuring low levels of activity, e.g. of tritium in urine using liquid scintillation counting, and of radium, uranium and thorium in rocks, bricks and coal using sodium iodide scintillation counters. Her last four years with the MRC were spent on trace element analysis of human tissues, diet, air and water using mass spectrometric and x-ray fluorescence techniques to obtain data on elemental distributions in human tissues, and to investigate the relationships between these distributions and environmental pollution and disease.

Margaret was in charge of the trace element laboratory and five technical staff until the unit closed down in 1972 as a result of government reorganisation.

Between 1972 and 1973, Margaret was a Lecturer in the Department of Physics Applied to Medicine at Middlesex Hospital Medical School. She developed thermoluminescent dosimetry methods for patient dose measurements and computer techniques for the planning of treatment schemes for patients using external beam therapy. Her duties also included the calibration of cobalt-60, caesium-137 and 8 MV x-ray machines in the Radiotherapy Department.

From 1973 to 1975 Margaret worked as a scientist at the British Industrial Biological Research Association in Carshalton, Surrey. Here she developed gas chromatographic/mass spectrometric techniques for the analysis of carcinogens in food additives.

Then her career with Imperial College began in 1975. First as a Lecturer, then, in 1986, she became a Senior Lecturer and Director of Operations and Safety at the Reactor Centre, Silwood Park, Ascot. In 1983, Margaret became Radiation Protection Adviser (RPA) at Imperial College and has been Consultant RPA to Imperial College from 1997 to the present.

Margaret's teaching activities at Imperial College included supervision of PhD students and the organisation of short courses for outside users. These included:

• legislation and radiation; • operational radiological protection; • introduction to nuclear engineering; • radioactivity in the environment.

She was also the convenor of the option `Radioactivity in the Environment', which is part of the MSc in Environmental Technology, and of a new MSc course at the Reactor Centre on environmental analysis and assessment.

The main areas of her research at Imperial College have been applications of radioactive and stable tracer techniques to biological problems and the study of the effects of trace elements, including radionuclides in the environment.

For 11 years she worked with the Medical Research Council and was engaged in research into radiation doses received by man from various radionuclides found in the environment and medicine. This has been a continuing research interest. Much of this work involved collaboration with other departments in Imperial College and brought together the radiochemical and radiological aspects, plant ecology and risk assessment. Applications to human problems were the study of magnesaemia in children and the absorption of iron, zinc and calcium in nutrition using healthy volunteers.

Margaret also used the technique of neutron activation analysis to study many elements simultaneously and was able to evaluate antagonistic and synergistic effects in relation to diabetes, coronary heart disease and multiple sclerosis. Other work was in the field of brain disorders in rats caused by manganese and zinc toxicity.

Margaret joined the SRP in September 1976 and was elected Fellow in January 1990. She has made a valuable contribution over the years to the success of the Society. Some 10 years as Honorary Treasurer (1986–1996) and a year as President in 1997/1998 crown a career both distinguished and of high achievement. She has also been a member of many other committees including the Bursary Awards Committee, Scientific Programme Committee, Ad hoc Public Information Group, Strategic Planning Committee and she was Treasurer for Southport '99. These various contributions give a clear indication of her commitment and breadth of interest. Margaret has also contributed to various committees outside the SRP, including AURPO Executive and Technical Committees, a MAFF working party on radionuclides in foods and the Environment Agency Small Users Group. She is currently on the HSE Working Group on Ionising Radiation (IRAC).

Her publications in various journals number 58 and she has 18 conference papers to her credit.

Margaret Minski now lives on the south coast at Saltdean near Brighton and still works part-time at Imperial College. Her main activity is now fundraising for the RNLI, but she also fits in a day each week at the Citizens Advice Bureau. Other interests are line dancing and she has just taken up croquet.

Margaret is a most deserving recipient of an Honorary Fellowship of the Society for Radiological Protection and Council is very pleased to commend her to the Annual General meeting.

John W Stather

Born in Hull, John Stather graduated from Reading University in 1963 with a degree in Biological Sciences with honours in Botany. He went on to obtain a Masters degree in Radiobiology and then a PhD at the University of Birmingham.

In 1968 John joined the Medical Research Council's Radiological Protection Service (RPS), working at their headquarters in Sutton. Here he started his research work on the radiological protection problems associated with the biokinetics, dosimetry and risks associated with intakes of radionuclides. John worked for Jack Vennart who became a mentor in his work in this area. This work continued when he transferred to NRPB when it was formed in 1971.

His research work also encompassed studies related to the movement of radionuclides through the foodchain and assessments of health effects resulting from their discharges to the environment. A watershed in his career was the identification of the leukaemia cluster around Seascale and, the Black Advisory Group report (1984). This high profile issue required a comprehensive assessment of radiation doses to people in the region, and John led the NRPB team doing the work. This gave John the opportunity to broaden his experience and show his ability to bring together various threads of a complex situation and produce a coherent and authoritative report. During this time he says he clung to his experimental work on intakes of radionuclides `by his fingertips'. He was able to return to this area during the 1980s with Hylton Smith the then Head of the Biomedical Effects Department as his mentor. In 1986 when Hylton Smith left to become secretary of ICRP, John succeeded him as Head of the Biomedical Effects Department. During this period the Gardner hypothesis emerged and John took on a role similar to that for the Black Report, leading a large NRPB effort to provide dose calculations for COMARE. In 1990 he was promoted to the post of Assistant Director, responsible for Departments covering Biomedical Effects and Non-Ionising Radiations. The need to give expert testimony in 1992 in relation to two cases of leukaemia in the Sellafield area was a defining moment and demonstrated new challenges that science would be increasingly faced with. In 1993 he became Senior Assistant Director and in 1997 he became Deputy Director of NRPB.

By the end of the 1980s issues relating to non-ionising radiation (NIR) were starting to have a significantly high profile. Throughout his career John has always shown great energy and drive, and this he emphatically displayed in becoming knowledgeable about NIR and helping drive forward policy development. In 1990 he wrote the terms of reference for the Board's first Advisory Group, the Advisory Group on Non-ionising Radiations (AGNIR). John has been an Assessor for the AGNIR since then, and heavily involved in their publications on possible risks from power line EMFs and the health effects of ultraviolet radiation.

In September 1999 the Board set up the Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones under the chairmanship of Sir William Stewart. John was a secretary to the Group, and again his drive and determination was a factor in ensuring that the comprehensive report from the Group was published in May 2000—on time and to budget.

John has played a significant role in the international scene. He has acted as a consultant to the CEC on the toxicity of radionuclides and their behaviour in the environment and was a member of a Task Group of Committee I of the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP) on deterministic effects of radiation. He has acted as an invited expert for the US DoE for reviews of research proposals and progress reports. He has been a consultant to the United Nations Scientific Committee on Atomic Radiations (UNSCEAR) on biological effects of ionising radiations and to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the practical application of ICRP's recommendations. He is Vice-Chairman of ICRP Committee II, chairs an ICRP Task Group on internal dosimetry of radionuclides, and he is a Vice-Chairman of the European Late Effects Project Group. He has been involved in the organisation of a number of scientific meetings and workshops concerned with the dosimetry and effects of radioactive materials. Most recently his ICRP work has involved producing Publication 88 on doses to the embryo and foetus following intakes of radionuclides by the mother.

Over the years John has contributed significantly to the work of the SRP, as a member of the Programme Committee and in the organisation of a number of the Society's meetings.

John Stather is a most deserving recipient of the award of Honorary Fellowship of the Society for Radiological Protection, and Council is very pleased to commend him to the Annual General Meeting.

Penelope Allisy-Roberts

Dr Allisy-Roberts (Penny) has been actively involved in radiation protection since her graduation from the University of Birmingham and taking up employment in the Regional Physics and Radiation Protection Service, located in the Queen Elizabeth Hospital, Birmingham, in 1971, the same year that she obtained her MSc in Radiobiology. In addition to her many other functions and activities (mentioned later) she worked part-time on research which led to the award of a PhD in 1980. She gained the Radiation Protection Adviser's Certificate of HPA (later to become the Certificate of Competence of the Joint SRP/IPEM Scheme) in 1982. She was made a Fellow of IPEM in 1988 and the Royal College of Radiologists gave her the well-deserved accolade of Honorary Member following much work on its behalf as adviser and examiner. The SRP welcomed her as a Member in 1984. She was elected to Fellowship of the Institute of Physics in 2000.

In 1988 Penny was promoted to Head of the Regional Radiation Protection Service. She later moved from Birmingham to take up the demanding post of Director of Medical Physics and Medical Engineering at Southampton University Hospitals in 1990. While at Birmingham and Southampton Penny was closely involved in teaching both undergraduate and postgraduate students. The NRPB also took advantage of her teaching skills and she became part of the faculty for their Advanced Courses in Radiological Protection. Then in 1994 Penny moved to Paris to a post in the International Bureau of Weights and Measures (BIPM) where currently she is head of the Ionising Radiations Section and therefore concerned with metrology, international standards and inter-comparisons of radiation and radioactive sources for radiotherapy and radiation protection.

The foregoing is no more than a very brief summary of Penny's academic achievements and work in paid employment. This would have been quite enough for most people. However, in addition, Penny has participated in a very strenuous programme of work with the professional societies which in turn has led to her playing a leading role in providing advice to Government and national bodies. In 1982 Penny joined and subsequently chaired the Radiation Protection Special Interest Group of IPEM, among other things compiling and co-ordinating the society's comments on the proposed Ionising Radiations Regulations 1985. Her work at this time also extended to the Guidance Notes which, little though she knew it at the time, she would revisit in 1999. With the implementation of IRR99 and IRMER2000 new guidance was needed to replace the former Guidance Notes issued by the NRPB in 1988. Penny was chairman of a small IPEM working group who took on the huge task of preparing such a replacement document. The group produced, with the aid of volunteers working in health care, a consultation document in April 2000. The aim of this document, like the Guidance Notes, was to provide general guidance and good practice for the use of ionising radiation in hospitals. Considered views, opinions, ideas and constructive criticism were obtained from over 20 national organisations and 15 medical physics departments on this first draft. Amongst the contributors there were representatives from the HSE, DoH, MDA, NRPB, EA, RCR and CoR and many other individuals too numerous to name here. The final result—19 chapters, 21 appendices, 275 pages and nearly 2 years of consultation later—was the `Medical and Dental Guidance Notes'. This tome, which is recognised unconditionally as a massive effort and of significant importance to the medical physics community, stands as a good marker of the dedication, prowess, determination and persuasive character that Penny possesses. Penny and the others closely involved in the production of this document deserve warm praise and congratulations from the medical physics community at large. It is therefore very fitting that the SRP recognises the great achievements and success of Penny's career which is perhaps epitomised in some small way by this document.

She joined the Council of IPEM in 1986, became its Vice-President in 1988 and subsequently its President. She was a member of the SRP/IPEM group which devised and introduced the Joint Certification Scheme which, thanks to the spirit of co-operation thereby engendered, would lead to much more co-operation and co-ordination between IPEM and SRP as well as the more formal linkages in the context of the Committee of the British Radiation Protection Association (BRadPA). Penny served this latter committee as both chairman and treasurer and, on the demise of BRadPA, was a founder member of the SRP International Committee bringing to it a truly international flavour in view of her day job at BIPM and her membership of the French SRP.

She was elected to SRP Council in 1994, was a member of the Article 31 Group (which advises the European Commission on radiation protection) from 1993–1996, and a member of ICRP Committee 3 from 1993–1997. A founder member (in 1987) of the HSC Working Group on Ionising Radiations (later to become the HSC Ionising Radiations Advisory Committee (IRAC)), Penny spoke up for the medical physics community alongside Keith Boddy. Her contributions were valuable and much appreciated, a fact recognised by the award in 1999 of the OBE for services to radiation protection. She continues to be a member of IRAC and combines this with being an active member of the Editorial Board of the Journal of Radiological Protection.

The platforms of the SRP, IPEM and many international bodies have enjoyed and benefited from her presentations—always delivered in a manner which appeals to audiences, with totally relevant illustrations and commentary.

In this citation it has been possible to cover only the highlights of a career which, even to date, has been so extensive and has contributed so much, not only to radiation protection as a scientific subject, but to the organisation and professionalism so necessary for a successful discipline. Dr Allisy-Roberts is a worthy recipient of the Society's Founders Prize.

What follows are my own views which do not necessarily agree with those of SRP Council.

We have heard much recently about the changing role of the radiation protection professional. How does the SRP fit into this? It is important that SRP not only keeps abreast of developments, but also makes a contribution to those developments.

The SRP is not a revolutionary organisation but has evolved and continues to evolve to meet changing circumstances. Its basic aims have changed little but the emphasis and implementation of those aims has moved on.

A brief history may help to put the current and possible future role of the SRP into context. Next year's AGM will see the 40th anniversary of the Society. It started as the UK section of the Health Physics Society (HPS) in May 1963. After some two and a half years it broke away as the Society for Radiological Protection. Initial aims as a branch of the HPS included:

• to hold scientific meetings; • to forge links with other UK societies with interests in radiation protection; and • to forge links with other national societies in Europe.

Its stated aims on becoming independent were `to aid in the development of the scientific, technological, medical and legal aspects of radiological protection, including nuclear safety and allied subjects in the manner of a learned society and to promote and improve radiological protection as a profession'.

The current objectives of the Society are:

(a) to promote and advance the science and art of radiological protection and allied fields; (b) to promote, advance and disseminate, to the public advantage, knowledge of radiological protection and allied fields; (c) to encourage, support, promote and advance education and learning in radiological protection and allied fields; and (d) to promote and encourage high scientific, educational, regulatory and professional standards in radiological protection and allied fields.

The Society sets out to achieve its objectives in a number of ways. I will consider these under the following headings:

• Scientific meetings • Publications • Communications • Qualifications and professional recognition • Influence • International matters • Awards • Structure of the Society.

Scientific meetings

From the beginning the SRP has normally held three to four, normally one-day, scientific meetings each year. In recent years the meeting associated with the AGM has often been a two-day, and last year for the first time, a three-day meeting. The AGM meeting and one other are now normally held outside London. Week-long international meetings are arranged every four years where possible.

These meetings have covered a wide range of topics and are aimed at advancing radiological protection and educating those attending. The Scientific Programme Committee and Council continually review the meeting arrangements. In recent years the main meetings have been supplemented by workshops, road shows (e.g. to consult and provide information on the Ionising Radiations Regulations, IRRs) and local meetings.

The content of meetings has changed to reflect the interests at the time. Early meetings were mainly concerned with technical matters while modern meetings are often more concerned with social and regulatory issues.

A major benefit of meetings is that it allows people to meet and talk informally outside the meeting proper.

I see meetings continuing much as at present but the frequency, duration, content and location are constantly being reviewed.

Publications

From 1967–80 a newsletter was published which was replaced by the Journal of Radiological Protection (JRP) in 1981. Since then the Journal has grown in stature to become a well-respected international journal. It is important that it continues. The current growth in electronic communication will of course have an effect on JRP as on other journals.

A new newsletter was started in 1996 to provide information to SRP members. This continues to be a useful publication for members which should continue. However, there could be advantages in making it normally available through the members-only section of the SRP website but with a printed version still being available to those that required it.

Communications

The SRP website was set up in 1997. It is a mine of information and also has extensive links to other related sites. Much of the site is open to all although there is also a members-only section. The site has a no-nonsense approach and does not slow down transmission with lots of pretty pictures and effects. For someone on the end of a modem line I find this a boon.

Many of the SRP committees and groups have contributed to the site and continue to do so. I could probably fill this piece with a list of the available information so will only suggest that you visit the site at www.srp-uk.org. It includes much educational material for the public and information for the professional. The Communications Group, a committee of SRP, are very active in developing and adding to the site which must continue to have a major role in the future.

An e-mail discussion group started in 2000 which is open to all, members and non-members alike. At the latest count there were 553 members, many of whom are the silent majority but if you have a question, information or a gripe in the radiological protection field, this could be the place to air it. An active e-group is an excellent means of communication and discussion.

I am aware that not everyone has access to the web and e-mail. Where possible the SRP Admin Office will provide copies of documentation to members on request.

Qualifications and professional recognition

Certification as a Radiation Protection Adviser (RPA) or specialist has evolved from 1979 and became a joint scheme with the Institute of Physics and Engineering in Medicine (IPEM) and the Association of University Radiation Protection Officers (AURPO). To satisfy the requirements of HSE, it is now operated by RPA2000, an independent company with SRP members on its board of directors.

The SRP also runs a Continuing Professional Development (CPD) Scheme which is open to all. As it says in the notes for the scheme: `Participation in the scheme: is a useful personal aid to planning and recording you own professional development; is a guide to those areas where development is beneficial to you; is a guide to employers to help them recognise the importance of CPD for their staff; will help you to prove to prospective employers that you are continuing to develop professionally; and may be essential for you to continue to be a Radiation Protection Adviser.'

The SRP is also heavily involved in National Vocational Qualifications (NVQs, SVQs in Scotland)—it is to be hoped that a route for assessing and awarding an NVQ at Level 4 in radiation protection will be found and used.

There is concern in some circles that there will not be sufficient radiological protection professionals to meet the demand. This needs to be kept under review and entry into the profession encouraged. The SRP produce a leaflet `A Career in Radiation Protection' which has just been updated.

Since 1987 full members of the SRP have been allowed to use the designatory letters MSRP (or FSRP for fellows). For the past few years Council has been considering applying for chartered status which would allow those qualifying to be recognised as chartered members. Council would expect this to be all full members in the first instance. The debate on the pros and cons continues in the newsletter and on the e-group. As an individual I find the advantages and disadvantages finely balanced at present but I do feel that we should look into it further. An informal approach is to be made to the Privy Council to find out what are the possibilities. Of course such a step could have an effect on other societies with an interest in radiation protection and we are, or will be, talking to these to discuss our proposals and their views.

Influence

What influence does the Society have on government, the media and the public? I believe that the Society needs to become more active in this area. We do get involved in matters relating to professional development but have hesitated to express opinions on radiological protection matters. We all know the story that if you ask four health physicists a question you will get five different answers. How does one form a Society view? Particularly at short notice, it is not possible to reach a concensus. However, I believe that chosen, experienced members of the Society should express opinions on its behalf. I fully support current SRP moves looking at improving our contacts with the media. Good risk communication is not an easy task. Doing it effectively will require considerable effort but it is not something that we should shy away from.

International matters

All those belonging to one of the Partner Societies of the SRP may join the International Radiation Protection Association (IRPA) through the International Committee of SRP (each country can only be represented by one society). The Partner Societies are:

• Association of University Radiation Protection Officers (AURPO) • British Institute of Radiology (BIR) • British Nuclear Medicine Society (BNMS) • College of Radiographers (COR) • Institute of Physics and Engineering in Medicine (IPEM) • Institute of Radiation Protection (IRP) • Royal College of Radiologists (RCR).

With the second largest international membership after the US HPS, the SRP maintains strong links with IRPA. It also has good relations with other European societies and encourages developing societies world-wide.

Awards

These exist to recognise achievement but mainly to encourage involvement in radiation protection through bursaries and other educational and career support. There are a number of regular awards but ad-hoc awards may be made where there is a need.

Structure of the Society

The Society structure is not cast in stone. Over the past few years we have formed topic groups and regional groups within the Society. The Practical Radiation Protection Topic Group and the Regulation, Legislation and Standards Topic Group not only arrange meetings or workshops but are active in compiling information which is made available on the web. Members have come forward to set up Regional Groups which hold regional scientific meetings and provide a focus for local members to discuss matters of mutual interest. Two are well established in the North West and Scotland and another has just been formed in the South West.

As the Society continues to grow it may be that groups should be formed to reflect the different work sectors which require radiological protection practitioners and the SRP will consider this.

The operation of the SRP has been very effective over the years, thanks to the goodwill and informal communication between the various committees. It is important that this interaction continues. However, the question `Is the committee structure appropriate for the current state of the Society?' needs to be asked from time to time and will be a matter to be considered in the next year.

Conclusions

I believe that the SRP works well and is responsive to changing conditions and the needs of members and potential members. This does not mean that we have got it all right and, indeed, what is right today may not be right tomorrow.

In the modern world we need to seriously consider the status of the Society and its members and how this can be improved. We need to raise our profile in providing advice to government and international organisations and being seen as a source of reliable and timely information for the media and the public. We also need to ensure that the structure of the Society best meets the needs of members and potential members and that the Society operates efficiently and effectively.

These are not easy matters and I look forward to an interesting year as the President of the SRP.

New members

Lt A Anderson, US Navy, Medical Service Corps Ms A Bhayani, Johnson Matthey, Royston Mr N F Brierley, Frank Brierley Dental, Bolton Mr A W J Burt, Devonport Royal Dockyard, Plymouth Mrs P R Duerden, BNFL, Risley Prof S B Elegba, Nuclear Regulatory Authority, Nigeria Mr T O Faleye, Royal Marsden NHS Trust Mr T G Godfrey, Amersham plc Mr W F Good, Synetix Tracerco, Billingham Dr R A Guilmette, Los Alamos National Laboratory, USA Mr R W Hardman, BNFL, Springfields Mr D W Howarth, Lancashire County Council Mr J E J Lampard, NNC Ltd, Risley Dr S Mohammadi, Payam-Nour University, Iran Dr W R C Munro, Food Standards Agency, Scotland MR M S Patterson, AWE, Aldermaston Miss G Rodaks, NRPB, Glasgow Mr A M Wright, NRPB, Didcot

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Dr A L Smith, Risk Management Systems Ltd

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Miss J Barnes, Saint-Gobain Crystals & Detectors UK Ltd (from ssociate) Mr M A Cunningham, BNFL (from Graduate) Mr S Wharmby, DRPS (from Graduate)

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Miss C G Lacey, BNFL (from Student)

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Honorary Fellows 16 Fellows 49 Members 1016 Graduates 61 Associates 90 Students 20 Affiliates 29

TOTAL 1281

27 June 2002, Preston, UK Radiowave Exposures—A Cause for Concern? Enquiries to: SRP Admin Office, PO Box 117, Buckfastleigh, Devon TQ11 0WA, UK (Tel: 01364 644487; Fax: 01364 644492; E-mail: admin@srp-uk.org; Web: www.srp-uk.org)

22–26 July 2002, Darwin, Australia Third International Symposium on the Protection of the Environment from Ionising Radiation: The Development and Application of a System of Radiation Protection for the Environment Enquiries to: Symposium Secretariat: GPO 461, Darwin, NT, Australia (Tel: +61 8 8981 4230; Fax: +61 8 8981 4316; E-mail: symposium@eriss.gov.au)

26–30 August 2002, Geneva, Switzerland International Conference on Occupational Radiation Protection: Protecting Workers Against Exposure to Ionizing Radiation Enquiries to: Ms Evelyne Janisch, Conference Service Section, International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA-CN-91, Vienna International Centre, PO Box 100, Wagramer Strasse 5, A-1400 Vienna, Austria (Tel: +43 1 2600 21312; E-mail: anish@iaea.org)

6 September 2002, Monaco, France 4th International MACCS Users Group Meeting Enquiries to: Energy Sciences and Technology Department, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Bldg 475C, 12 S Upton, NY 11973-5000, USA (E-mail: mubayi@bnl.gov or conrad@bnl.gov)

10–12 September 2002, Durham, UK Durham 2002, IPEM Annual Scientific Meeting & IBEX 2002 Exhibition Enquiries to: Durham 2002 Secretariat, c/o IPEM, Fairmount House, 230 Tadcaster Road, York YO24 1ES, UK (Tel: 01904 610821; Fax 01904 612279; E-mail: durham2002@ipem.org.uk; Web: www.ipem.org.uk)

11–13 September 2002 EPICOH Congress Web: www.suportserveis.es/pdf/epicoh.pdf)

22–24 September 2002, Oxford, UK BNES 4th International Conference on Health Effects of Low Level Radiation Enquiries to: Ms Sue Frye, Conference Office, Institution of Civil Engineers, One Great George Street, Westminster, London, SW1P 3AA (Fax: 0207 233 1743; E-mail: Sue.Frye@ice.org.uk)

8–11 October 2002, Florence, Italy European IRPA Congress 2002. Towards a Harmonisation of Radiation Protection in Europe Enquiries to: Mr Francesco D'Alberti, Congress Secretariat, SSPRP Unit TP510, JRC 21020 Ispra (VA), Italy (Tel: +39 0332 785657; Fax: +39 0332 789413: E-mail: irpa2002@irc.it)

23 October 2002, London, UK Internal Dosimetry Enquiries to: SRP Admin Office, PO Box 117, Buckfastleigh, Devon TQ11 0WA, UK (Tel: 01364 644487; Fax: 01364 644492; E-mail: admin@srp-uk.org; Web: www.srp-uk.org)

16 January 2003, London, UK Accidents and Incidents Enquiries to: SRP Admin Office, PO Box 117, Buckfastleigh, Devon TQ11 0WA, UK (Tel: 01364 644487; Fax: 01364 644492; E-mail: admin@srp-uk.org; Web: www.srp-uk.org)

2–4 April 2003, Oxford, UK ALARA Enquiries to: SRP Admin Office, PO Box 117, Buckfastleigh, Devon TQ11 0WA, UK (Tel: 01364 644487; Fax: 01364 644492; E-mail: admin@srp-uk.org; Web: www.srp-uk.org)

2–5 June 2003, Utrecht, The Netherlands Radiation Protection Symposium of the North West European RP Societies Enquiries to: Netherlands Society for Radiological Protection (NVS) (E-mail: utrecht2003@nrg-nl.com; www.nvs-straling.nl)

23–28 May 2004, Madrid, Spain IRPA 11th Congress Website: www.irpa11.com

Further information on conferences can be obtained from

• IRPA website: www.irpa.net • IAEA website: www.iaea.org

London, January 2002

The meeting was organised by the SRP to review current research and discuss the use, dispersion into the environment and radiological impact of depleted uranium (DU) by the UK and US in recent military conflicts.

Brian Spratt chaired the morning session of the meeting and stressed the need to gauge the actual risks involved in using DU and to balance professional opinions with public mistrust of scientists and government bodies. He asked whether more could be done by the radiation protection profession to improve communication with the media, pressure groups and the public in general.

Ron Brown, of the MOD Dstl Radiological Protection Services, gave a thorough overview of the origins and properties of DU, focusing on munitions, in the UK and abroad and public concerns arising from its use in the 1991 Gulf War. He gave a brief overview of past DU munitions studies by the UK and US governments and contrasted this with the lack of hard data used to back up claims made by pressure groups. He compared the known risks of DU with other battlefield risks, e.g. biological agents, chemical attacks and vaccines, and questioned whether peacetime dose limits should apply to soldiers on the battlefield.

Barry Smith, of the British Geological Survey, spoke on DU transport, pathways and exposure routes focusing on groundwater as an important example in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Kosovo. He discussed the large amount of work that has already been done on natural uranium in groundwater, with particular emphasis on its mobility within the soil and rock profile being strongly dependent on precipitation and the local geochemical conditions. Therefore, generic risk assessments will not be sufficient in gauging risks to local populations after the introduction of DU into their environment; local geochemical conditions must be taken into account. However, experiments are required to fully appreciate the extent to which DU, particularly DU:Ti alloys used in munitions, disperses into the environment in a variety of soil types.

Barry outlined recent computer modelling work investigating the time taken for DU to migrate from a buried munition to a borehole in three different scenarios. The modelling revealed times from 30 years to 5 × 10⁹ years depending on the local geochemical environment and the depth of the DU penetrator in the soil profile. This suggests the real possibility of borehole contamination within a human lifetime in wet conditions similar to those found in Kosovo.

Nick Priest, of Middlesex University, discussed methods of biological monitoring for natural and depleted uranium. The preferred method of detection is by 24 h urine sampling, with measurement of the total mass or isotopic ratios of uranium using mass spectroscopy (ICPMS). This is because uranium is only deposited in new areas of bone growth, a slow process in healthy adults, the remainder is filtered by the kidneys and excreted in urine, giving a non-invasive and rapid sample collection method. Nick also described a rapid assessment technique to look for total uranium and DU in a sample, using a multi-collector ICPMS, specifically looking at the ²³⁵U:²³⁸U ratio with ²³⁶U as a tracer to determine the total mass of uranium present and its source.

The MC-ICPMS method was applied in a BBC Scotland funded study of uptakes of uranium in three populations in the Balkans during March 2001. Variable levels of DU were found in each population. The age of the subject was found to influence the excretion of natural uranium and DU to the same degree, increasing age leading to increased excretion. Overall, the levels of DU were extremely small (tens of µg), but DU was found to be present in each population investigated. The MC-ICPMS method is capable of detecting  1% DU in natural uranium and Nick intends to extend the study to include ground and drinking water samples and food in the same populations.

Neil Stradling gave a talk on the contribution of the NRPB to the WHO report on DU published in April 2001. It addressed the biokinetics of inhaled uranium oxides resulting from exposure to military and civilian use of such materials by workers and members of the public. Intake levels of DU based on IRR99 effective dose limits were derived for workers and members of the public, taking into account retention in the lungs and kidneys and excretion via urine. These were combined with the ICRP human respiratory tract transport model and absorption data from animal studies to suggest that lung monitoring is a valid method for assessing doses of less than 20 mSv if undertaken within one month of intake. However, if at least 10 ng of DU can be detected in a 24 h urine sampling regime, doses of ~1 mSv can be assessed many years after exposure.

The nephrotoxicity of DU was discussed and whether exposure limits should be based on the radiological or toxicological hazard. Combining the two approaches, and on the basis of both human and animal experiments and models, Neil suggested that current limits are too high. Specifically, the acceptable kidney concentration of DU should be reduced from 3 µg g^-1 to 0.3 µg g^-1 and the permissible exposure levels for all uranium isotopes in air should be reduced to about 50 µg m^-3. Current WHO standards were found to offer an adequate level of protection, except for inhaled Type S (insoluble) uranium compounds.

Dudley Goodhead chaired the afternoon session of the meeting and began by comparing the risks of the radiological effects of DU with its chemical toxicity. Using the example of an embedded piece of DU shrapnel he discussed the limitations of conventional risk estimation by ICRP models and showed that there is a significant knowledge gap to close between past research that considered effects in isolation and future work that must include the possible synergism between radiological and chemical effects.

Steve Shelton, of Dowbiggin Ltd USA, described on-going experiments at the US Army Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona investigating the transport of DU contamination from munitions in an alkali sand/soil environment. Initially 30 DU penetrators were buried at various depths up to 25 cm in the desert environment to investigate corrosion rates and the resulting migration of corrosion products. Soil wetting and drying cycles were found to be the most important functions controlling corrosion, and significant DU migration of up to 25 cm was found in penetrators buried for less than 2 years. A second similar experiment investigated differences in corrosion characteristics between fired and unfired penetrators, revealing that fired penetrators eventually suffer more rapid corrosion.

Steve briefly mentioned plans to construct a catchbox to catch and recover intact fired DU penetrators without contamination. The work is focusing on replacing the currently used sand with a high-density polymer gel.

The final section of Steve's presentation covered investigations into phytoremediation of contaminated areas at Yuma using desert grasses and a project to track and control airborne particulate DU. Observations revealed that surface transport by wind is the most important dispersion process in a desert environment such as Yuma that receives very little rainfall and where the water table is hundreds of metres below the surface.

Keith Baverstock, of the World Health Organisation, then spoke on the potential direct health hazards of inhaled DU, primarily the risk to the lung and the tracheobronchial lymph nodes, which can potentially retain DU particulates indefinitely. Three factors potentially relevant to the carcinogenic effects of exposure to DU must be considered if a full risk estimation is to be made. These are:

• chemically induced cell transformations; • synergism between chemical toxicity and radiological effects; • the bystander effect in which cells that have not been irradiated exhibit radiobiological effects if they are in proximity to a cell that has been irradiated.

However, an additional, indirect major health hazard to be considered is the psychosocial effect. The public fear of radiation in the environment and the stress arising from that fear create a public health detriment regardless of the direct risk. This effect is persistent and cannot simply be removed by press releases from relevant bodies. Keith considered that there is a clear need for an improved international framework for the protection of the health of the public from environmental exposures to radiation.

Phil Sutton, Director of Research at the MoD, gave a presentation from the operational perspective of DU munitions. DU is used primarily in anti-tank shells and main battle tank armour. It was originally developed to defeat Communist Bloc T72 tanks protected by explosive reactive armour (ERA). DU will penetrate ERA and steel plate armour by virtue of its pyrophoric nature, whereas conventional rounds constructed from tungsten simply flatten against steel plate or are repelled by ERA. In turn, the high density of DU is used in armour to defeat tungsten anti-tank shells.

Tanks equipped with ERA are increasingly common since the break-up of the Communist Bloc and older tanks are often fitted with ERA to increase their capabilities. Therefore, to limit UK casualties in a conflict, DU shells and armour will be retained and used until superseded. However, Phil also spoke briefly about current research which is focusing on novel tungsten alloys and reducing the DU content in anti-tank shells.

To round off, there were two short presentations by T Cabianca and P Danesi of the IAEA concerning investigations into the DU legacy in Kuwait and the IAEA contribution to environmental contamination assessments of DU in Kosovo. In Kuwait the on-going study is limited to an assessment of the potential radiological consequences of DU residues in three types of site: open desert where DU was fired, farmland where DU was fired and DU storage facilities. The Kuwaiti government has also requested the IAEA to formulate a structured approach to deal with remediating such sites and disposing of the resulting material. In Kosovo the study investigated sand and soil samples from areas where DU had been fired. DU particulates were found in sizes up to 40 µm, but generally much smaller, typically about 5 µm, with 5% less than 1.5 µm in size. These particles were found to contain 90% DU and 1% Ti. Plutonium was also detected, but this was attributed to the 1960s bomb testing programme.

This was an informative, well attended meeting that stimulated varied debate between delegates. It revealed that there is still much to learn concerning the effects of depleted uranium in the human body and highlighted the limitations of conventional dose estimates made using ICRP models. A balance must be struck between the operational requirements of the armed forces and acceptable levels of environmental contamination arising from any conflict they are involved in. Most importantly, as a scientific consensus is developed, a clear and consistent approach to providing key information to the public should be adopted, to build confidence in the radiation protection profession.

Manchester, 6 March 2002

The SRP North West Regional Conference was held in the Education Centre, Christie Hospital NHS Trust in Manchester on the subject of Ionising Regulations 1999 (IRR99) two years on. The Chairman for the morning session was David Abbott from BNFL and for the afternoon was Anne Walker from Christie Hospital.

Dr Joanne Nettleton, a HM Principal Specialist Inspector (Radiation) in the Field Operations Directorate, explained the view of the HSE. She outlined that the IRR99 have been in force since January 2000 after a comprehensive consultation exercise. The results that have been seen to date are, not surprisingly, no increase in exposure levels, an increased profile of radiation protection and an improved standing of RPAs. There are still some employers claiming ignorance of the existence of the IRR99 and of the new requirements. One area of misunderstanding of concepts is on risk assessments and improvement notices have been issued to several employers. The HSE experience on training is that there is room for improvement in all the premises visited. Many people were unaware of the basic principals of radiological protection with scant knowledge of requirements of IRR99. There have also been problems with supervisions with the role of the RPS (Reg. 17) having muddled duties, confusion of the role and insufficient numbers. Another difficult area has been the designation of areas (Reg. 16). In this area there has been little change from the IRR85, however there is still difficulty in the interpretation of `special procedures', inadequate restriction of access, poor planning and location of changing areas and poor monitoring records. Other areas of HSE experience where improvements are needed are on the classification of workers (Reg. 20), local rules and the arrangements for the control of radioactive substances. Jo summed up by saying that the view of the HSE is that the employers need more commitment and a better understanding of their role and that of others. There needs to be more consultation with RPAs and more focused advice. The HSE are to make more inspection effort and have recruited a number of new specialists.

Colin Partington, Chairman of SRP QPS, provided an update on RPA 2000, an assessing body under IRR99. There are two certificates available, firstly the Certification of Competence to be an RPA under IRR99 and secondly a Specialist's Certificate. To date, RPA 2000 have issued a total of 134 RPA Certificates and 69 Specialist Certificates. The process of RPA 2000 involves submitting a portfolio which will be looked at by one assessor and summaries supplied to the other two assessors. Candidates must demonstrate that they have sufficient evidence from education, training and/or experience to demonstrate a knowledge and understanding of the basic syllabus, a detailed understanding of IRR99 and its ACOP and other related non-statutory guidance, and have practical radiation protection experience. They should also have a sound knowledge of the general methods which might be typically used to deal with operation problems, including interpreting and applying radiation protection data, supervision or carrying out practical measurements and control procedures for work involving potential for significant exposure to radiation. They must also have the ability to advise management effectively on the implementation of relevant regulatory requirements and radiation protection practices for work involving potential for significant exposure to radiation. The assessment is based on a portfolio of evidence of personal information, education and training material to illustrate breadth and depth of experience. There are nine areas of competencies each of which have three sub-areas. To date the problem areas with the portfolios have been insufficient evidence of the basic knowledge and training, safety culture/behaviour, waste managements and transport, interactive competencies and extent of experience required. The SRP run a Continuing Professional Development scheme as a personal aid to maintain an adequate level of professionalism, demonstrate competence and as a guide to employers for them to maintain a professional Radiation Protection Service. There are currently over 300 people using the SRPs CPD scheme. They have also detailed a new mentoring system. In conclusion RPA 2000 is successfully meeting the needs of RPAs in the UK and the portfolios of evidence are improving. Overall, the SRP CPD scheme is effective and cheap.

David Owen, Radiological Protection Manager responsible for policy and strategy issues in this field, gave a summary of the operation of the BNFL RPA Assessment Scheme, of which he is Secretary to the Management Board. The BNFL RPA Assessment Scheme is recognised by the HSE and has a number of subtle differences from the RPA 2000 scheme. The initial difference is that the Management Board has a number of additional representatives: a legal rep, a trade union rep and an independent person. Everyone who submits a portfolio has to attend an interview. Training is the responsibility of the individual and/or BNFL. This may include examinations and on the job work. BNFL are looking at formalising competencies development and training links. Within the portfolio there are a set of standard proformas covering the HSE competencies and these detail the appropriate guidance and evidence. Each needs to be signed off by the tutor or competent person. Portfolios are set up in conjunction with the Mentor. The assessment system at BNFL is also slightly different as each assessor receives a full copy of the portfolio and they are all allowed to request further information; they meet to discuss the portfolio and then arrange an interview. This process is expected to take not more than 28 days from receipt of the portfolio. The interview involves a structured discussion with the aim of ascertaining the extent of the candidate's knowledge. There is a bank of questions to facilitate consistency and it is necessary to answer 70% correctly. All interviews are recorded which allow a possible review by the independent member. The assessor panel consists of Plant Managers and at least two RPAs, all of whom have received formal training. The re-certification process is the same as RPA 2000. If somebody has RPA 2000 certification it is recognised by BNFL, however it is still necessary for him or her to go through the BNFL process to establish suitability. It is a BNFL-wide scheme, which will have approximately 100 people going though it in the next five years. Overall the BNFL scheme contains more guidance and structure than RPA 2000.

Dr David Smith and Dr Alan Hinchcliffe from DSTL Radiological Protection Services are currently reviewing RPA standards for the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory's Radiological Protection Services (DRPS) and David is taking this work forward towards DRPS accreditation as an RPA Body. DRPS has 106 personnel of which 45 are Health Physicists, four of which have the RPA 2000 certification and 25 are transitional RPAs. The key tasks are operational advice, policy support, nuclear accident response and support to laboratories and dosimetry. They provide support to the Army, Royal Navy, RAF, Defence Logistics Organisation, MOD Centre—policy, Dstl and Qinetiq and other government departments. The principal role of the MOD Corporate RPA is IRR99 and to provide advice on RSA93, REPPIR 2001, transport, medical, public relations, non-ionising radiation and research. The RPAs are involved in the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme, Nuclear Weapon Programme and Nuclear Accident Response. Generally, fixed sites have their own resident RPA and dosimetry services. Examples of work performed are health physics and RPA supplied to assist with HMS TIRELESS at Gibraltar and carbon-14 assessments and decommissioning at the RN College Greenwich. The RPAs also provide advice to other government departments; an example is the use of mobile x-ray equipment as part of the HM Customs and Excise anti-smuggling campaign. The MOD has some 2000 units and sites which utilise radioactive sources or ionising radiation. David concluded the presentation by highlighting that Dstl look after a huge range of activities of ionising radiation and non-ionising radiation. They have a huge number of users and sources (approximately 3/4 million) which need to comply with legislation, however trivial, which is a very difficult task. It has been learnt from previous examples that it is necessary to consult with an RPA as soon as possible. The RPA Body need to demonstrate quality and consistency of RPA advice.

Andy Hancock, an RPA working in the Radiation Physics section of Medical Physics at University College London Hospital NHS Trust, spoke about his own views on the role of the RPA in the Health Service. He highlighted the issue that other specialists such as medical physics experts are not required to be appointed in writing. RPAs advise on the restriction of exposure, designation of area, local rules, selection of the RPS, the training of the RPS and other staff, hazard identification, risk assessment, facility design, contingency planning, waste management and transport and any other matters relating to ionising radiation. Becoming an RPA within the medical sector is not easy. Firstly there is two years basic training and four years advanced training, followed by two years experience—but then it is also necessary to be the correct grade according to the Department, so it can take up to 16 years! The areas of healthcare specialities include diagnostic radiology, nuclear medicine, radiotherapy, radiation protection and others. In diagnostic radiology it is expected that the RPA writes the local rules and risk assessment which is not necessarily the correct procedure. The RPA should also be involved in the equipment quality assurance performance and assessment, covering the issues of procurement, the critical examination, the acceptance test, routine quality control, patient doses and new techniques. These last two used to be the responsibility of the RPA, however now the medical physics expert must be involved. The RPA should be advising on staff doses, assisting in investigation and aiding dose restriction/reduction. In new radiological facilities the RPA should advise shielding requirements, calculations and measurements. Finally the RPA needs to perform proactive safety audits/inspection and attend meetings and aid with teaching and training. In nuclear medicine again the RPA is expected to write the local rules and risk assessment, advise patients of their conduct at home, assess staff doses, provide advice on new facilities and equipment, and assist with radio pharmacy design and safe working.

At the end of the conference there was an opportunity to ask the presenters questions which I am sure everybody found most useful, and then there was a tour around Christie Hospital's Radiation Facilities. Overall the conference provided a useful overview of the implementation of IRR99 two years on.

Vienna, 15–26 April 2002

The Second Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Nuclear Safety was held in the Headquarters of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna from 15–26 April 2002, under the chairmanship of the President, Mr Miroslav Gregoric, Director of the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Authority.

The Convention on Nuclear Safety entered into force in October 1996, has been signed by sixty-five States and ratified by fifty-four, bringing within its scope 428 of the 448 nuclear reactors worldwide. The Convention aims to achieve and maintain a high level of nuclear safety worldwide, through inter alia enhancement of national measures and international co-operation. Obligations on Contracting Parties in accordance with the Convention include: the establishment and maintenance of a legislative and regulatory framework to govern the safety of land-based civil nuclear installations; the allocation of adequate financial and human resources to support the safety objectives; ensuring that all reasonably practicable improvements to safety are made as a matter of urgency.

Adherence to this Convention entails two basic commitments by each Contracting Party:

• to prepare and make available a national report for review; and • to subject its national report to a peer review by the other Contracting Parties.

Thus, being a Contracting Party to this Convention involves:

• including in the national report a self-assessment of steps and measures already taken and in progress to implement the Convention obligations; • taking an active part in an open and transparent review of its national report and the Reports of other Contracting Parties; and • a commitment to a continuous learning and improving process, something which is a key element of a strong safety culture.

The peer review of national reports takes place every three years, the first having been held in 1999. The Second Review Meeting was attended by delegates from 46 contracting parties. There were over 400, compared to 150 at the First Review Meeting, clearly indicating the great importance attached to the Convention by Contracting Parties.

In accordance with the procedures of the Convention all contracting parties submit a national report and, in turn, receive for review the reports of all other contracting parties. There is an opportunity for contracting parties to pose, in writing, questions and comments on the reports received. Subsequently, in the forum of small working groups (`Country Groups'), the national reports are formally presented for review by the national representatives and the report contents, as well as responses to written questions and comments, are closely scrutinised for compliance with the Convention. The time available for the review of national reports ranges from a half to a full day per report, depending on the scale of the nuclear programme in the individual country.

The national reports submitted were in most cases of high quality and provided ample information on steps and measures taken to implement the obligations of the Convention. An important objective of the review process is to observe and take note of improvements in the period between successive review meetings. However, some Contracting Parties did not clearly identify the actual changes that had taken place since the First Review Meeting, and this led to extended discussion in some Country Group sessions.

During the review certain issues were identified that require special attention, particularly, with regard to safety management, safety culture, plant ageing, upgrading and effectiveness of regulatory practices, as well as maintaining competence and knowledge in the industry, regulatory bodies and research institutions.

The review process highlighted factors and circumstances, external to nuclear safety as such, which nevertheless may impact on nuclear safety. Such factors include:

• deregulation of electricity markets and changes of ownership; and • changes in markets affecting the nuclear industry and changing priorities in university research in several regions of the world, with consequent effects on the availability of competence in nuclear science and technology.

It was noted that in the present changing energy market in many countries, it is important that utility managers as well as regulatory bodies appreciate the potential effects on safety of severe financial constraints.

The status and position of regulatory bodies was a key topic of the Review. Although improvement was reported, the area of human and financial resources of regulatory bodies was highlighted as warranting further attention. This focus is especially needed in those countries where the salaries that the regulatory body can offer its staff are low compared to the equivalent levels in the industry. The maintenance of competence of the regulatory body, in the light of competitive job markets and the retirement of experienced staff, was identified by several contracting parties as a significant problem which is likely to increase in the future.

Modernisation programmes were reported to have helped in maintaining and increasing staff competence and motivation. A continuing trend was reported towards increased use of simulator training, commissioning of new plant specific simulators, implementation of new operating procedures, including symptom based procedures, and guidelines for severe accident management. International peer reviews were considered to be effective tools for supporting regulatory improvement programmes. Contracting Parties were invited to provide further information in their next national reports on maintaining competence and motivation of staff needed for safe regulation and operation of nuclear installation.

Since the 1999 Review Meeting, several Contracting Parties have restructured their regulatory bodies and adopted new legislation or improved existing legislation to more closely meet the requirements of the Convention. Examples of areas of new legislation are: establishing independent regulatory bodies; emergency preparedness; decommissioning; and radiation protection provisions consistent with the International Commission on Radiological Protection's 1990 Recommendations (ICRP 60) and the International Basic Safety Standards published by the IAEA (BSS). Full implementation of the ICRP 60 recommendations and BSS is not complete in some countries.

Contracting Parties reported on their individual national regulatory strategies. Some Contracting Parties use probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) as an additional tool in optimizing their regulatory or inspection activities, and some use performance indicators, whether they be quantitative or qualitative, to monitor the safety of their nuclear installations. In discussions, comparison was made of the advantages and disadvantages of regulations that are detailed and prescriptive in nature as compared to less prescriptive, goal-oriented approaches and the complementary use of risk assessments. Contracting Parties agreed to review their experience and report at the next Review Meeting.

All Contracting Parties with a nuclear power programme have in place integrated emergency response plans. These plans are tested with varying frequencies and there are regular exercises of an international nature. Clear progress has been achieved in the area of emergency preparedness since the First Review Meeting, including measures for communication with the public, establishment or upgrading of crisis centres, establishment of intervention levels, emergency planning zones, early warning systems and ways of distributing stable iodine.

For Contracting Parties without nuclear installations, the main focus of reporting was on emergency planning and on active participation in international emergency exercises. Many of these countries have developed extensive monitoring and response capabilities. An important issue for non-nuclear countries with nuclear facilities on or close to their borders is communication with neighbouring countries and bi-lateral arrangements for information and assistance in the event of a nuclear emergency.

In the light of the tragic events of 11 September 2001, the issue of assuring the security of nuclear installations from terrorist attacks was a matter of significant concern to Contracting Parties. Security and physical protection matters are outside the scope of the Nuclear Safety Convention so this matter was not discussed in any depth. It was also recognised that the sensitivity of information related to the issue would make it difficult to conduct meaningful discussion. Contracting Parties were encouraged to address this issue in other appropriate international fora and in bilateral consultations.

During the plenary sessions there was a discussion on the value of efforts to increase public access to national reports. Although this subject is formally outside the scope of the Convention, some Contracting Parties emphasised how a clear, open and proactive policy of providing information to the public on regulatory requirements, decisions and opinions, contributes to the establishment of an independent, competent and credible regulatory body. In this respect, 22 Contracting Parties reported that they already publish, on the internet, their national reports, answers to questions from review meetings, and summary inspection reports, as a sign of improving openness and transparency.

In conclusion, Mr Gregoric, President of the Review Meeting, reported that significant progress has been observed in a number of key areas, such as strengthened legislation, regulatory independence, the availability of financial resources, enhanced emergency preparedness and safety improvement at nuclear power plants built to earlier standards. He went on to say that the commitment of states to all aspects of nuclear safety is higher than ever and that there is real dedication to international information sharing, learning from the lessons of others and to constant vigilance and improvement, focusing more on human and organisational aspects and safety management—the key ingredients of safety culture.

Portoroz, Slovenia, 17–19 April 2002

This third workshop was jointly sponsored by the IAEA and OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. It was organised by the European Commission Directorate-General for the Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection and the ISOE European Regional Technical Centre. The workshop provided a forum for Health Physics practitioners and operators to exchange information and experience on occupational exposure issues at Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). There were approximately 130 participants of whom 63% were from utilities, 11% from contractors and 26% from regulatory bodies.

The first morning heard an introductory speech by Abel Gonzales (IAEA Director of the Division of Radiation and Waste Safety) who presented an entertaining review of the risk of low doses. He drew on the recent UNSCEAR reports relating to public health effects of low doses and concluded by observing that under the Napoleonic code it was virtually impossible to demonstrate that cancers were not caused by radiological doses. Sandor Deme (KFKI Atomic Research Institute, Budapest) outlined the radiation environment in low Earth orbits. In such environments >85% of dose originates from protons that become trapped in the magnetic belts surrounding the Earth. Therefore orbital conditions (height, duration) were critical in minimising dose to astronauts. Average dose to Space Shuttle astronauts ranged from 0.2 to 32 mGy (flight time dependent) with the highest dose rate of 3.2 mGy/d being 6 times that for MIR cosmonauts. Stefan Mundigl (NEA) concluded this introductory session by presenting the ISOE 10th Anniversary report.

Session 1: Implementation and practical consequences of the Basic Safety Standards (BSS)

There were 9 presentations in this session, chaired by Rodriguez Marti (CSN, Spain) and Jochen Naegele (EC, DG4), with a diversity of arrangements reflecting how the BSS or parts of them have been introduced. Much of the work presented had been covered before and the participants recognised the efforts and improvements made in some eastern European countries where extendibility of EU membership is an important driver. Differences in the culture of countries were also evident between goal setting and prescriptive regulations.

The session started with `international civil servant' K Schnuer (EC) who discussed enlargement of the EU where the process is split into the scope of Screening, Negotiation and finally a Common Position. Those countries with NPPs likely to gain membership in the near future are Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Romania, Slovak Republic and Slovenia. M Gustafsson (IAEA) covered the work by the IAEA to support some developing member states to implement the BSS. Many countries had no infrastructure for RP implementation and she commented on the milestones achieved in helping to complete identified gaps and provide standards. The IAEA give support by close monitoring and peer reviews for some 81 countries worldwide with 31 peer reviews performed in 1999–2001. Christian Lefaure (CEPN) compared specific aspects of the BSS within RP national regulations across Europe. Austria, France and Italy remain the only EC countries who are yet to implement the BSS, similarly the Czech Republic, Slovak Republic and Slovenia are the non-EC countries with NPPs. He described and specifically compared how the three fundamental principles of RP have evolved and are now used. The justification principle is now re-emphasised in nearly all countries regulations. This is accompanied by a stronger control by authorities of activities involving radioactive substances. The optimisation principle wording refers now explicitly to economic and social factors in many countries and explicitly mentions, in a few cases, patient exposure. It is now a stricter regulatory requirement including prior risk assessment, operational dosimetry, and information to stakeholders and ALARP responsibilities. Dose limitations for avoiding deterministic effects are standard although in Germany there are specific organ dose limits. Dose limits for stochastic effects do vary. Although the public dose limit is 1 mSv per year some countries have source constraints: Netherlands 0.1, Lithuania 0.2, UK and Germany 0.3 mSv per year. Occupational limits are 100 mSv over 5 years with 50 mSv per single year, or 20 mSv per calendar year or even 20 mSv per 12 consecutive months (Austria, Belgium and France). Germany has an annual average of 10 mSv with 400 mSv over a working life.

Wendy Bines (HSE) covered the IRR99 and focused on some of the differences in GB legislation (Judicial Precedent) compared to the BSS, with emphasis on `reasonably practicable', setting investigation levels, approval of Approved Dosimetry Services (ADS) and the appointment of RPAs. She presented the success of dose trends that had fallen since the introduction of the IRR85. She stated the role of HSE in provision of information and advice as well as its formal enforcement regulatory powers. B Breznik (Krsko NPP, Slovenia), D Viktory (State Health Institute, Slovakia) and G Klevinskas (Lithuania) respectively discussed implementation of the BSS in their countries. W Pfeffer (Gesellschaft fur Anlagen-und Reaktorsicheriheit, Germany) gave an enlightening account of German legislation covering all aspects of RP (due to practices, natural sources, consumer products and emergencies) legislation, which is prescriptive, specific and detailed and includes:

• tables defining exemption limits, clearance levels, values for surface contamination; • requirements for the clearance of radioactive material; and • parameters and maximum concentrations for radionuclides from facilities into the air or water including the calculation procedures to be followed.

The regulations specify the delineation of areas for potential exposure on and off site (public <0.11 µSv/h, Company site 0.11–0.5 µSv/h, supervised 0.5–3 µSv/h, controlled >3 µSv/h, and restricted areas >3 mSv/h). These regulations have expanded on the BSS exemption values using NRPB R306 to include clearance values for conditioned and unconditioned release. It specifies clearance criteria for re-use, recycling and disposal plus multipliers for limits of surface contamination depending upon the area designation.

The final presentation of this session was a view expressed by J Lebeau (Tricastin NPP, EDF, France) on the French regulations on implementing optimisation. EDF have provided guidelines to control high doses during steam generator work. This involves dose forecasting using historic dose information and structured (maintenance) and non-structured (services) activities (mapping dose rates and occupancy). Discrete `level bands' based on collective dose and dose rates are used to focus optimisation input (1 man Sv: 0.1 mSv/h, 1–10: 0.1–2, 10–30: 2–40, and >30 man Sv: >40 mSv/h). Different approvals for each level up to senior RP authorities are required based on the `level band' categories. EDF employ three phases of ALARP: planning, implementation and feedback experience. Task checklists, individual and collective dose targets are set at each band. Dose deviations during tasks and dose comparisons post activity are performed, and for discrepancies in-depth analysis is made. He identified the main implementation difficulties as principal contractors using sub-contractors who may not `sign onto' ALARP and the level of analysis required to identify good and poor performance required for the feedback post outage report. Although French legislation has not yet been provided due to reorganisation of authorities, the expected requirements to reduce dose over the next decade will be a challenge.

Session 2: ALARA management

This session of 9 papers was chaired by Stefan Mundigl (NEA) and Manfred Meyer (Philippsburg NPP, Germany). Kenneth Ohr presented an invited paper from the North American Technical Centre on cobalt-60 problems at Quad Cities (BWR). In order to reduce inter-granular stress corrosion cracking on system internals the NPP had embarked on a programme of rhodium and platinum injection. Previously a campaign of injecting depleted zinc oxide (DZO) to reduce available sites for cobalt deposition had taken place. The timing of DZO and noble metal injection was critical to managing evolving transport of activation products. The paper reported the problems of higher than expected dose rates encountered around the plant and analysed a number of other causes that exacerbated the problems. Alain Rocher (EdF) described the chemical behaviour of a number of significant radiochemical species in the primary coolant of PWRs. The behaviour of cobalt-58/60, silver-110m and antimony-122/124 is important in managing contamination of primary circuit surfaces, where 90% of doses will be received.

Fredriksson (Westinghouse, Sweden) described a decontamination technique using ice particles as an abrasive on fuel assemblies. Tests had shown removal of about 50% of deposited crud from two-year-old fuel. Papers by Ian Terry (Framatome)/Borut Breznik (Krsko NPP, Slovenia) and Alexander Petrov (Balakova NPP, Russia) discussed radiological issues relating to Steam Generator replacements. On a similar theme, but unique to a VVER reactor, Gabor Volents talked on Steam Generator feedwater distribution pipes. All these papers highlighted the need for detailed planning, use of shielding and full size mock ups for training.

Two specialist papers followed. Replacement of Boraflex neutron absorbers in spent fuel storage racks by Luc Vermeullen (Tihange, Belgium) and doses due to handling and storage of spent fuel in concrete containers by Vovik Atoyan (Armenian NPP).

The concluding paper for this session, succinctly presented by Jean Pierre Degrange (CEPN), analysed in some detail doses due to shipping spent fuel containers in France. It was reported that up to 1 man Sv per year was received in preparing and shipping 200 PWR fuel containers. This is equivalent to the maintenance dose for one plant but to date has had very little review to enable collective doses to be optimised. Interestingly one factor that increased doses was the time spent to ensure that external surfaces were free of contamination. The majority of the dose was received during flask preparations rather than during flask monitoring. Suggestions to improve flask management could result in approximately one third of the collective dose being averted.

Session 3: A common radiological safety culture within nuclear utilities and contractors

There were 8 presentations, chaired by Monica Gustafsson (IAEA) and Simon Morris (British Energy), that ranged from aspects of co-operation between operator and radiation employer, radiation passbook standardisation, experience from a legal EPD ADS, Company dose constraints to initiatives for screening contaminated casualties, RP culture and RP self assessment.

V Pletniov (Ignalina NPP, Lithuania) covered the culture change undertaken for improvements in co-operation between employers, with emphasis on the control and the management of outside workers, that had shown benefits in reduced trends in both individual and collective dose. The scope included clear allocation of tasks and responsibilities, use of radiation passbooks and extensive outside worker training (60 hours) before starting elementary duties. Two papers followed on radiation passbooks, Dr M Gonin (EDF, France) and M Andersson (Westinghouse Atom, Sweden), both of which suggested adoption of a common `Euro' radiation passbook especially for itinerant outside workers. Gonin initiated this across some Company medical officers across the EC and outlined common objectives, particularly for contract workers. Andersson presented issues and problems specific to some Swedish workers who are required to be issued with and use German passbooks whilst seconded to work in Germany rather than using the Swedish equivalent passbook. It appears that the German operator has recently established agreement to accept a specific Swedish generated alternative, although clear advantages of a `Euro' radiation passbook were proposed.

Andy Weeks (BNFL) discussed the process and his experiences to date in obtaining and operating an EPD legal ADS. He covered the HSE framework laid down for ADS approval, the logistics of the service, the EPD system and the interaction between clients. Prominence was given to an auditable quality assurance system where commonly occurring corrective actions relate to non-recording of training and dealing with computer system failure. He covered data verification and diagnostics using typical reactor-type response curves and hard to soft gamma ratios, plus the management of dose estimate amendments when information is lost. It was a surprise to note that there were only 136 visits above 10 µSv out of 126,695 (0.12%) for Dungeness B in 2001. The use of EPD has removed the large statistical uncertainties in calculating site and group collective doses associated with passive dosimeters.

Simon Morris (British Energy) presented the policy behind the introduction of a Company Dose Restriction Level (CDRL) (dose constraint) and the practicalities of its application during years 2000/1. The CDRL had never before been exceeded until following a successful BE outage campaign there was an extensive plant failure at one BE site; this resulted in 39 contract staff exceeding the 10 mSv CDRL (maximum 13.8 mSv). The dose performance improved over recent years even with a significant increase in maintenance. He showed that self-regulation and an independent central safety division can and did influence effective dose reduction (collective and individual). Dr E Laporte (EDF, France) covered screening arrangements for health protection as primary control procedures for accidents occurring in controlled areas. He suggested a pragmatic approach where in most cases the medical interventions far outweigh those of personal contamination. W D Wood (Donald C Cook NPP, USA) discussed the use of commonality initiatives in US NPPs to improve RP culture and worker efficiency. There was an impression given of beg, steal and borrow from the leading US utilities for this small independent plant. US plants have learned that common procedures, policies, instrumentation, tools and work practices achieve improvements to the RP culture. Also significant worker efficiency achievements had been accomplished. He addressed the management challenges presented by deregulation of the US sector, reduction in the pool of outage contractors and ageing of the experienced radiation worker population. He discussed the 5 year plan developed to achieve the new INPO 2005 dose goal of 650 person mSv/year for PWRs. S Schofield (San Onofre NPP, USA) discussed the RP self-assessment programme used as a management tool for efficiency improvements. With the US there is an element of regulatory confidence given for sites that adopt self-assessment. Such a programme should proactively identify potential problems and develop improvements to enhance management effectiveness. He discussed lessons learned and management tools, which evaluate workforce and Health Physics staff performance to improve RP practices.

Session 4: Management of contamination control

The last session presented 6 papers and was chaired by Yves Garcier (EdF) and Carl Goran Lindvall (Barseback NPP, Sweden). The first paper by Mathew Lunn (Sizewell B, BE) explored the basis for the assessment and recording of personal contamination events. Such events have provoked much regulatory interest in the past. This paper detailed the re-evaluation of the installed personnel monitoring equipment calibration protocol. Matt concluded by describing the practical outcome of using a revised protocol whereby detection probabilities had increased but without a significant increase in contaminated events.

The paper by Richard Doty (Susquehanna NPP, USA) examined the problems associated with discrete hot particles. A project to clean up the fuel pool resulted in a number of instances of significant skin doses (maximum 0.17 Sv). The realisation that deep dose, as well as shallow dose, was an issue caused the utility to review its control procedures. These events were subject to peer review and INPO and WANO (SER 2001-2) reports were issued.

Georgi Valtchev (Kozloduy NPP, Bulgaria) outlined a dose assessment program (DOSEART) developed to measure internal doses that conformed to the Bulgarian regulatory standards. Their program, written in Visual Basic 5.0, was verified against LUPED 2.07. Svitek Jaroslav described the contamination monitoring arrangements at the Slovakian NNP Bonhunice. The last two papers (Schartman and Meyer, Germany) assessed the possible consequential doses to persons removing contaminated personal clothing from a NPP and the review of the standards used at German NPPs to ensure regulatory compliance and to minimise the probability of individuals leaving site with contaminated personal clothing.

What proved to be a valuable part of the Workshop were the two sessions dedicated to Group Discussions. Prior to the Workshop attendees were asked to identify topics they would like to discuss. These topics were `sorted' into subject areas and participants allocated to groups that best suited their areas of interest. These sessions enabled each group, of typically 10 persons, to exchange ideas and information between nationalities. For example, benchmarking of radiological protection teams roles, how far did utilities manage performance indicators (PI), what did PI mean to regulators, the use of dose constraints in optimisation of protection. The group considering use of PI contained regulators and utility participants in equal measure. They had an interesting debate whether a PI could be a goal or target, and what the regulatory response might be if such goal or target was not met.

If any papers from this workshop are required then contact the reviewers.

Seoul, Korea, 14 November 2001

This symposium was co-organised by the Radiation Health Research Institute (RHRI) of Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power Co Ltd (KHNP) and the Institute of Radiation Medicine of Seoul National University Medical Research Center, and supported by the Korean Ministry of Science and Technology. The main topic of the meeting was the health effects of exposure to low levels of ionising radiation and this was presented and discussed in two sessions dealing with epidemiological and molecular studies. The welcoming address was given by Jong Shin Kim, Senior Vice-President of the Power Generation Division of KHNP. He emphasised the importance of research on low dose radiation effects and the role of the two Korean organising institutes in this research.

The first session concerned epidemiology and was chaired by Chang-Soon Koh of the Department of Nuclear Medicine of Gachon Medical School. Keun-Young Yoo (Seoul National University College of Medicine, Korea) gave the first presentation on the epidemiological studies of workers and nearby residents of Korean nuclear power plants. Korea now has 16 nuclear power plants making the country the sixth largest in the world in terms of nuclear generating capacity. Concerns over the operation of these nuclear power plants upon the health of workers and members of the general public living around the plants have led to large-scale epidemiological studies of the workers and nearby residents. Each participant has been given a full medical examination and completed a detailed questionnaire at a direct interview. Cancer incidence has been determined through active and passive surveillance. Appropriate control groups have been used. At present these studies have not indicated any detrimental effects that can be attributed to radiation exposure. The Korean nuclear workers will make a valuable contribution to the international study of radiation workers that is currently underway. In the second talk Richard Wakeford (BNFL, UK) reviewed the results of epidemiological studies of nuclear industry workers in European countries. Almost all of the epidemiological information on occupational exposure to radiation has come from British workers because of the difficulties in conducting detailed epidemiological studies in other Western European countries. However, in the last few years valuable studies of nuclear workers in the former USSR have been undertaken, and these studies are particularly interesting because of the high doses that many of these workers received. The British studies have indicated a dose-related effect for leukaemia with little consistent evidence of any other radiation-related risk at present. Recent results from the study of the Mayak workforce in Russia have provided clear evidence of excesses of lung, bone and liver cancers among heavily exposed plutonium workers. Chong Soon Kim (RHRI, Korea) then reviewed the findings of epidemiological studies of high natural background radiation areas. A number of studies have been conducted in such areas around the world and these have generally found no association between health effects and radiation exposure. However, these studies are not particularly informative because of their low statistical power and they are `ecological' studies of groups rather than individuals. In Korea a high background radiation study was started in 2000 to evaluate whether those living in the high background radiation area of Geosan were experiencing a detectable increase in adverse health effects. Measurements of environmental radioactivity, indoor and outdoor radiation exposure, a questionnaire survey and chromosomal aberration studies are underway in a preliminary study.

The second session considered molecular studies and was chaired by Myung-Chul Lee of the Department of Nuclear Medicine at Seoul National University College of Medicine. The first paper was by Yoshiya Shimada (National Institute of Radiological Sciences, Chiba, Japan) who spoke on the understanding of molecular mechanisms for the assessment of risk from low dose radiation. The susceptibility to radiation-induced cancer could be influenced by several factors including genetic make-up, lifestyle and hormonal status. Investigations are currently underway on radiation-associated molecular lesions in radiation-induced thymic lymphomas in mice, which suggest that loss of heterozygosity at the Ikaros locus represents a radiation signature. These and other results will provide new molecular tools for an understanding of both the mechanism of radiation carcinogenesis and the risk of radiation-induced cancer. Takeo Ohnishi (Nara Medical University, Japan) spoke on radiation adaptation. Studies had been carried out of radiation-induced Bax and apoptosis (cell killing) in the mouse spleen after whole-body irradiation at low doses or low dose rates. In particular, the role of DNA-PK activity in radioadaptation was examined. Bax and apoptosis induced by acute irradiation were suppressed by prior low dose rate irradiation except in mice with defective DNA-PK activity, suggesting an important role for this activity in radioadaptation. Radiation hormesis was the subject of a talk by Kazuo Sakai (Central Research Institute of the Electric Power Industry, Tokyo). An adaptive response is observed when mice are exposed to a low dose of radiation before a large dose of radiation. This suggests that adaptive response might suppress the process of carcinogenesis, which could be important to an understanding of the risk arising from exposure to low dose radiation. Finally, Jai-Ki Lee (Hanyang University, Seoul) emphasised the importance of the shape of the dose–response curve at low doses. If the shape of this curve could be better known then a firmer basis for radiological protection at low doses might be established, which may mean less onerous restrictions upon exposures. Microdosimetry is important when considering the interaction of an ionising particle with a cell nucleus and these mechanistic considerations should not be forgotten.

This international symposium dealt with the important issue of the health effects of low dose radiation from the viewpoints of epidemiology and molecular mechanisms. These two scientific approaches should be considered as complementary and much is to be gained in having a meeting to consider both aspects of radiation risk. There are many interesting developments in both fields and the findings in one should feed into the thinking in the other. The co-organisers hope to hold annual meetings to discuss developments in the understanding of the health effects of low level exposure to ionising radiation.

WONUC (ed) Amsterdam: Elsevier (2000) 539 pp, ISBN: 0-444-50513-x

This book presents the proceedings of the First International Symposium organised by the World Council of Nuclear Workers (WONUC) which was held at Versailles, France, on 17 and 18 June, 1999. The book opens with an explanation of just what the World Council of Nuclear Workers is and what its aims are. WONUC was founded in 1996 as an association of the Unions and other organised bodies of the world's nuclear industry workers. It was established because WONUC considers that the nuclear workers are faced by two unusual challenges:

• the lack of understanding of the nuclear industry by the general public; • the activities of extremist environmentalist movements whose final aim is to deprive the nuclear workers of their jobs.

WONUC is quite forthright about the rights and duties of nuclear workers.

In view of the aims of WONUC it is perfectly understandable that one of their main interests should be the effects of low doses of ionising radiation on human health and their organisation of this symposium in 1999 is entirely appropriate.

The proceedings start with a short foreword by Maurice Tubiana in which he presents the epidemiological, scientific and regulatory problems that are associated with the health effects of low radiation doses in the 0–500 mSv range. The first section of the book covers the opening address, also by Tubiana, and keynote papers by authors such as Roger Clarke, Albrecht Kellerer, Monica Gustaffsson, Carmel Mothersill, Klaus Trott and Roland Masse. Many of these papers, although not all, are substantial and even though they are written in a philosophical style reviewing the level of knowledge in specific areas relevant to low dose health effects, they contain a large amount of useful information and this is definitely the `meaty' part of the proceedings. However, it is worth noting that some of these keynote papers have also been published elsewhere in the open literature (see, for instance, Radiation and Environmental Biophysics volume 39 (2000) and Journal of Radiological Protection volume 19 (1999)) and this duplication deprives these proceedings of some of their exclusivity.

The rest of the book, some 450 pages, covers the topics: `Models and controversies in radiation carcinogenesis'; `Chernobyl effects'; `Radon and mining'; `Natural radiation'; `Low dose risks'; `Molecular biological mechanisms'; `Epidemiological data'; `Effects on thyroid diseases'; `LNT controversies'; `Neutron and x-ray effects' and `Working conditions'. This is a broad range of relevant topics and at first sight the book looks appealing and promises to be informative. However, the papers in these sections, which fall into two categories, those with a philosophical approach and those presenting some scientific results, do not really address any of these topics in either depth or detail. The papers presenting scientific results are, on the whole, disappointing and do not offer any remarkable results or new techniques or developments. One interesting paper in this category which does take a new approach to the low dose problem is that of Duport, `Non-linearity between dose and cancer risk for internally deposited alpha and beta emitters in animals' (page 97), but the paper is, unfortunately, marred by bad editing and/or proof reading. One table in this paper is printed twice, one under the other, and values given in the text differ from values in the tables. In spite of the fact that this is clearly a report of work in progress, such clumsy editing does not give the reader confidence in what is being presented. There are also many other typographical errors scattered throughout the book which is unexpected in material from such a reputable publisher.

The papers which take a philosophical approach constitute the greatest disappointment not so much for their content as for their clear prejudices. All these papers argue, rather forcibly, in favour of there being a no-effect threshold dose at low dose and against the concept of linear no-threshold (LNT) dose effects which is currently used in radiological protection regulation. The arguments presented by many of the authors in favour of a threshold dose are often based on the same, previously published material to justify their reasoning, and references to the work of Luckey on radiation hormesis, Cohen on a negative correlation between lung cancer incidence and radon concentration, as well as that on the non-linear relationship of bone cancer incidence in both man and animals from internally deposited alpha emitters, occur with monotonous regularity. It is, of course, not fair to judge papers presented in 1999 with hindsight from 2002 but, even before 1999, there were criticisms of much of this work and indications why the bone cancer incidence induced by internal emitters is non-linear although not necessarily indicative of a threshold. The uncritical, rather dogmatic attitude taken in so many of these articles is most unfortunate.

Although many scientists support the linear no-threshold concept used in radiological protection, it is clear that there are neither epidemiological data nor experimental radiation biological data which are accurate enough to resolve the shape of the dose effect relationship in the low dose region and differentiate between the two different concepts. It is also clear that the LNT-based concept of `collective dose' recommended by the ICRP has been abused and needs some modification but the solution of this problem will require open-minded discussion between adherents of both the threshold and the linear no-threshold concepts and will have to be very elegant and intelligently made.

The proceedings are very obviously biased towards the idea of a no-effect threshold dose and either WONUC has been misled by the purveyors of this concept or they are already confirmed believers in the concept. It is not difficult to understand that the idea that radiation has no effect at low doses is most attractive for nuclear worker organisations but, in view of the vigorous statement of their aims and intentions, it would have been much better if WONUC had taken a completely independent approach and had organised their meeting so that all sides of this topical and difficult problem of low dose health effects could have been voiced and discussed. Many of the authors of papers in these proceedings will, no doubt, say that other meetings and their proceedings on low dose effects are biased towards the linear no-threshold concept and that, moreover, it is almost impossible for them to participate in such meetings. However, WONUC could have established a series of meetings to provide an open forum for a fair and balanced assessment of the validity of the two different low dose concepts. As it is, it seems likely that WONUC will be identified with the no-effect threshold dose concept from now on and this will not make their stated aims easier to achieve.

The title of the book is misleading as these proceedings do not, unfortunately, provide much new data on `the effects of low and very low doses of ionising radiation on human health'.

Near Surface Disposal of Radioactive Waste: Safety Requirements (Safety Standards Series No WS-R-1) IAEA Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency ISBN: 92-0-101099-0

Safety Assessment for Near Surface Disposal of Radioactive Waste: Safety Guide (Safety Standards Series No WS-G-1.1) IAEA Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency ISBN: 92-0-101299-3

These two complementary documents have been issued as part of the IAEA's RADWASS programme. The Safety Requirements publication sets out basic safety requirements for the disposal of radioactive wastes in near surface repositories. The Safety Guide addresses the safety assessment for near surface disposal of radioactive waste and provides recommendations on how to meet the requirements set out in WS-R-1.

The scope of the Safety Requirements covers a wide range of repository designs, from above-ground structures to rock caverns at a few tens of metres depth. Such repositories are generally targeted at wastes containing short-lived radionuclides and low concentrations of long-lived radionuclides. The document is primarily aimed at new facilities, although the document suggests that it can be used in the review of existing and former repositories.

The document states that radiation protection requirements for the operational phase need to take due account of the Basic Safety Standards. For post-closure, criteria should be in terms of dose, risk or both. For modes of repository evolution judged to be likely, projections of dose or risks should not exceed some appropriate fraction of the 1 mSv/y dose limit, or its risk equivalent. For unlikely events, it is suggested that the regulatory body should decide whether the outcome should be compared with the risk constraint, or whether dose and probability of occurrence should be disaggregated.

In setting out organisational requirements, the document identifies what should be the roles of the waste generator, the repository operator and regulators, together with their interfaces.

The document goes on to address requirements for waste acceptance, and repository siting, design, construction, operation and closure of the repository and post-closure phase. It states that as far as practicable, the safety of a closed repository shall not rely on institutional controls that necessitate continuing active measures.

This Safety Guide concentrates on post-closure safety assessments; it is the behaviour of the repository over long periods which distinguishes repository assessments from the operational assessments as carried out for other types of waste management facilities.

The guide discusses the various uses of safety assessments, from establishing feasibility at an early stage, siting, establishing waste acceptance criteria, support licence applications and helping to design environmental monitoring programmes. The importance of an iterative approach is stressed.

The main part of the guide sets out the basic approach to repository safety assessments. It discusses data collection programmes and the development of conceptual and mathematical models, including the handling of features, events and processes (FEPS) and scenarios. The important aspects of sensitivity analyses and uncertainty and how they link are described.

Finally, confidence-building measures are discussed. Methods of model verification, calibration and validation are described, as well as the potential uses of natural analogues and the peer review of results.

These two documents provide a good introduction to the requirements for near surface repositories and a guide to safety assessments. They should be equally useful as an introduction to those new to this complex area, and as a reference for those with more experience.

London: The Royal Society

Somewhat less than a year after the publication of Part I, along comes the second and final part of this comprehensive treatise on depleted uranium (DU) munitions and their associated health hazards. Part I dealt with the radiological aspects of depleted uranium, and more specifically limited its scope to consideration of the exposure of military personnel. The opening chapter of the 134 page Part II report smartly goes right to where Part I did not go, namely to the nonradiological health impacts (i.e. chemical toxicity), delving into the possible, and potential for, nonradiological health effects of DU from munitions using a number of reasonable and reasoned scenarios. The emphasis here is on kidney toxicity and pulmonary effects, although there is also a nice albeit brief discussion of reproductive health effects. This is followed by a chapter on the environmental aspects of depleted uranium munitions, considering the source, mechanisms of distribution and pathways, and impacts on human populations. These two brief and yet seemingly comprehensive summary chapters encompass but 27 pages, and, despite their apparent objectivity and mainstream approach and evaluation, are sure to provoke a few discordant notes, particularly from those who feel that the current safety standard of 3 microgram of U per gram of kidney is adequate or even conservative, or who feel that the literature was incompletely or inadequately evaluated and cited. But to this reviewer, the preparers of Part II have done an excellent job of winnowing the wheat from the chaff, and these 27 pages provide essentially everything about the topic covered for all but the most detail-oriented individuals.

Chapter 3, entitled `Responses to Part I of the report' is not a series of responses to individual questions or comments proffered by peers or laymen as is often found in reports of this nature. Thus, to its credit, it does not address specific comments per se but makes much more effective and efficient use of the space, using the general comment thread as a welcome opportunity to cover such important topics as modelling, immunological effects (albeit not in as much depth or as forthrightly as one might hope, considering the all too frequent and largely anecdotally supported allegations of DU induced immunological effects in the media and by lay persons), and exposure to soldiers cleaning up contaminated vehicles—topics which were not fully dealt with in Part I. It is thus a useful adjunct or expansion of Part I.

The bulk of the Part II report is contained in the appendices. The 20+ page Appendix 1 on the chemical toxicity of uranium is concise, complete, highly readable, and, in a word, commendable. The rather longer Appendix 2, which deals with the environmental aspects, is likewise well done. However, Appendices 1 and 2 are in effect expanded and more detailed versions of Chapters 1 and 2, respectively, and one might ask why the report did not just combine them (i.e. the respective chapter and appendix) into a single detailed treatise. Regrettably, in an otherwise excellent report, the major question in the mind of the public, the media, and politicians, namely that exposure to DU produced various and sundry afflictions in those so exposed, is not fully nor even directly addressed, but seems to be rather pushed aside by the recommendation that this issue needs further study. And, consideration of biomarkers or potential biomarkers of DU exposure was wanting. The recommendations are by and large sound and solid, and fully consonant with the text.

Overall, the report is well done and quite readable, and highly recommended. In combination with its sister Part I, it should provide health physicists, physicians, and other professionals with an interest in the health effects of DU from munitions with a single (albeit two part) reference work for their professional library that is clear, concise, objective, scientifically defensible, and quite easy and indeed enjoyable to read; this is by no means a dull, dry, dusty sleep-provoking tome. Those who contributed to the report are to be commended for certainly, on balance, its merits far outweigh its short-comings. And, the Royal Society too deserves a bit of acclaim for making this document as well as its sister Part I available in complete electronic format via the internet.

Health effects of depleted uranium munitionsThe Royal Society (131–139) The Royal Society of London set up an independent expert working group to examine the health effects of exposure to depleted uranium (DU) munitions. The assessment covered both the radiological and chemical toxicity of DU and the results of the study are now available. Apart from in exceptional circumstances, the additional risk of developing fatal cancers due to exposure to DU is unlikely to be detectable above the general risk of dying from cancer over a normal lifetime. A small number of soldiers and civilians might suffer kidney damage from DU if substantial amounts are breathed in, or swallowed in contaminated soil and water. The majority of soldiers will be exposed to levels of DU from armour-piercing penetrators that are unlikely to cause heavy metal poisoning. However, the kidneys of a few soldiers may be damaged if they inhale large quantities of DU. The soil around penetrator impact sites may be contaminated by DU. Although only a small number of civilians will be at risk, heavily contaminated soil should be removed if battlefields are re-populated.

The potential for bias in Cohen's ecological analysis of lung cancer and radon in US homesJ H Lubin (141–148) Ecological analyses by Cohen show decreasing lung cancer rates with increasing mean radon concentrations for US counties. Cohen thus asserts that the linear-no-threshold model should be rejected for radon, and that his analysis eliminates confounding by using large numbers of adjustment variables. This paper demonstrates both assertions are erroneous. County-level, linear-no-threshold models are valid only when risk models for individuals are linear. However, lung cancer risk is not linear in radon concentration, and thus Cohen's rejection of the linear-no-threshold model is based on a false premise. We further demonstrate that county-level adjustment cannot eliminate within-county confounding.

Ethical, logical and scientific problems with the new ICRP proposalsK Shrader-Frechette and L Persson (149–161) In 2001 the ICRP proposed, in a memorandum published in this journal, a new system of radiation protection designed to be simpler, more oriented toward individual protection, and reflective of important ethical standards. The authors argue that the proposal violates important norms of scientific simplicity, is in fact less protective of individuals than the current system, and makes a number of ethical errors. After outlining 12 ethical errors, five logical errors, and two scientific problems with the new ICRP proposal, the authors suggest possible ways to remedy these deficiencies.

The need for changes in ICRP policy: some examples based on the Chernobyl experience in UkraineI Likhtarev and L Kovgan (163–173) Current ICRP recommendations are based on the independent restriction of exposure and sources for practices and interventions. This paper shows that in Ukraine, after the Chernobyl accident, a number of problems and contradictions have arisen as the result of the strictly separated limitation of sources and exposures. A number of examples are given which include the resettlement of inhabitants from territories radioactively contaminated after the Chernobyl accident to areas with higher levels of exposure due to very high radon levels. The authors argue that the concept of controllable dose as presented recently by Roger Clarke on behalf of the ICRP can resolve such paradoxes.

Energy response of LiF dosemeters to ISO 4037 and diagnostic x-raysW E Muhogora et al (175–184) The relative response of three types of LiF dosemeter to standard ISO 4037 (series 407) x-ray qualities and diagnostic x-rays was investigated in Tanzania. It was hypothesised that the inherent mismatch between these x-ray qualities could compromise the accuracy of personal dose in diagnostic radiology practices. The results revealed a maximum over-response of 52% for diagnostic x-rays relative to ISO 4037 x-rays, which should be considered during dose assessment. Based on the acceptable uncertainty for radiation levels well below the dose limits, the over-response, however, does not significantly compromise the accuracy of the personal doses.