Study on the balance mechanism of interests in marine ecological compensation

From the point of view of game theory and through establishing the game model of the subject and object of marine ecological compensation, this paper makes a research on the balance mechanism the interests of marine ecological compensation. The results show that the optimal amount of capital investment of environmental protection enterprises for ecological compensation depends not only on energy conservation and emission reduction of itself as well as competition enterprises, but also on the policy support for ecological compensation. At the same time, it is limited by the public’s understanding and acceptance for ecological compensation.


Introduction
The establishment of marine ecological compensation mechanism must take into account the interests of stakeholders and balance the interests of all parties. From the point of view of game theory, analyzing stakeholders of marine ecological compensation, and through establishing the game model of the subject and object of marine ecological compensation, this paper gives the optimal decisionmaking of stakeholders and puts forward the proposal which can balance the interests of all parties.

Model hypothesis of game analysis of ecological compensation
It is assumed that enterprises in each region can be divided into two categories: one is traditional polluting enterprises and the other is energy saving and environmental protection enterprises. Taking into account the high input and high pollution characteristics of current enterprise production in China, this paper takes into account Stackelberg game in the games between two types of enterprises. Further assumes of the model includ: Hypothesis 1: Polluting enterprise 1 which is a leader in the market competition organizes the daily production with constant marginal cost 1 c and sells the final product 1 q with the unit price 1 p in the market. The waste formation rate of the unit production is 1  in the process of manufacture. The amount of subsidy satisfies the condition: 2 . Hypothesis 3: The consumer public which is a continuous system with the same utility function has a linear demand form for products. The impact of consumer public on ecological protection is reacted in product selection through the environmental neglect degree  .

the optimal decision of consumer
According to the utility function established by Singh and Vives through analyzing the competition equilibrium of heterogeneous products (Singh&Vives,1984), this paper establishes a utility function including pollution products, environmental protection products and environmental utility.
The 0   represents the quality of the product, and the 0   means that the two products are substitutes for each other. In this section, we only consider the influence of product differentiation on the environment and do not consider the alternative function. Then  represents the degree which consumers ignore the environment. The number of  degree represents product differentiation. The closer  is to 1, the lower the environmental preferences of the consumer.Therefore, the higher consumption consumers ignore the environmental protection function of environmental protection products, the smaller the difference between environmental protection products and pollution products. The maximum consumer surplus:

the optimal decision of producer
Based on the two formulas of(1)、(2)and the first-order optimal condition of the maximization of consumer utility, we can obtain linear inverse demand function of two types of products: According to the backward induction, the maximize profit of environmental protection enterprise 2 in the second phase is: According to the first-order optimal condition, the optimal response function of environmental protection enterprise 2 is: When polluting enterprise 1 foresaw the response of environmental protection enterprise 2, the maximize profit of polluting enterprise 1 in the first stage: There are 1 , then according to the formulas of(3)、(4)、(5)、(6), we can obtain: Proposition 1: In the early stage of ecological compensation development, the environmental tax policy scope of government supporting the environmental protection industry must satisfy: 2  , environmental protection enterprises have the first-mover advantage.
Proving: In the early stage of ecological compensation development, the environmental tax policy scope of government supporting the environmental protection industry must ensure that two types of enterprises coexist, that is: 1 0 c q  , 2 0 c q  . According to the formulas of(7)、(8), we can obtain: