Abstract
Taking the shared bicycle parking order as the starting point, a variety of scenarios (daily, hurry, and other people's violations) and two freeloading psychological incentives (speculation and conformity) are constructed. It is believed that (1) The effect of incentives on individual travelers is limited, and there are certain internal distortions in the two-dimensional effects of norms and travel. (2) Incentives are effective for speculative travelers, while they have no significant effect on herd mentality travelers. Even drive travelers with a strong sense of social norms deviate from normative behavior. (3) Travelers with stronger speculative psychology are more sensitive to the time loss that may be embedded in incentives. (4) The range of available incentives with unique characteristics is different. The applicability of electronic fences is relatively stronger.
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