Jan C Scholz and Martin O W Greiner 2007 New J. Phys. 9 185 doi:10.1088/1367-2630/9/6/185
Jan C Scholz1,3 and Martin O W Greiner2
Show affiliationsPart of Focus on Complex Networked Systems: Theory and Application
Network creation games couple a two-players game with the evolution of network structure. A vertex player may increase its own payoff with a change of strategy or with a modification of its edge-defined neighbourhood. By referring to the iterated prisoners dilemma (IPD) game we show that this evolutionary dynamics converges to network-Nash equilibria, where no vertex is able to improve its payoff. The resulting network structure exhibits a strong dependence on the parameter of the payoff matrix. Degree distributions and cluster coefficients are also strongly affected by the specific interactions chosen for the neighbourhood exploration. This allows network creation games to be seen as a promising artificial-social-systems approach for a distributive topology control of complex networked systems.
02.50.Le Decision theory and game theory
Issue 6 (June 2007)
Received 16 February 2007
Published 28 June 2007
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