Jonas Cremer et al 2009 New J. Phys. 11 093029 doi:10.1088/1367-2630/11/9/093029
Jonas Cremer1, Tobias Reichenbach2 and Erwin Frey1
Show affiliationsThe functioning of animal as well as human societies fundamentally relies on cooperation. Yet, defection is often favorable for the selfish individual, and social dilemmas arise. Selection by individuals' fitness, usually the basic driving force of evolution, quickly eliminates cooperators. However, evolution is also governed by fluctuations that can be of greater importance than fitness differences, and can render evolution effectively neutral. Here, we investigate the effects of selection versus fluctuations in social dilemmas.
By studying the mean extinction times of cooperators and defectors, a variable sensitive to fluctuations, we are able to identify and quantify an emerging 'edge of neutral evolution' that delineates regimes of neutral and Darwinian evolution. Our results reveal that cooperation is significantly maintained in the neutral regimes. In contrast, the classical predictions of evolutionary game theory, where defectors beat cooperators, are recovered in the Darwinian regimes. Our studies demonstrate that fluctuations can provide a surprisingly simple way to partly resolve social dilemmas. Our methods are generally applicable to estimate the role of random drift in evolutionary dynamics.
GENERAL SCIENTIFIC SUMMARY
Introduction and background.Every ecological system is subject to a broad variety of fluctuations. Fluctuations can be weak without significant effects on the dynamics as well as strong, dominating the temporal evolution. In this work we investigate effects of fluctuations in social dilemmas. Social dilemmas can arise in groups of interacting individuals when cooperative behavior is beneficial for the whole group while free-riders, selfish individuals benefiting from the cooperators, are better off. Free-riders are then believed to overtake the population and eliminate cooperation.
Main results.Here we show that fluctuations can open a window of opportunity for cooperation. If stochastic effects are large enough, they can maintain cooperation for a long time and even eliminate defectors. We show that this behavior emerges when evolution is effectively neutral, as opposed to Darwinian evolution where selection is the dominant evolutionary force. Our studies allow for a quantitative delineation of both regimes by an emerging 'edge of neutral evolution'.
Wider implications.Regimes of neutral and Darwinian evolution separated by an edge of neutral evolution are expected to characterize most evolutionary dynamics. Our studies provide a path and the methods to the quantification of these regimes and thereby a better understanding of the role of fluctuations in evolution.
89.65.-s Social and economic systems
02.50.Le Decision theory and game theory
87.23.Ge Dynamics of social systems
05.40.-a Fluctuation phenomena, random processes, noise, and Brownian motion
Issue 9 (September 2009)
Received 28 April 2009
Published 22 September 2009
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