Steven Weinstein 2006 Class. Quantum Grav. 23 4231 doi:10.1088/0264-9381/23/12/017
Steven Weinstein1,2,3
Show affiliationsAnthropic arguments in multiverse cosmology and string theory rely on the weak anthropic principle (WAP). We show that the principle is fundamentally ambiguous. It can be formulated in one of two ways, which we refer to as WAP1 and WAP2. We show that WAP2, the version most commonly used in anthropic reasoning, makes no physical predictions unless supplemented by a further assumption of 'typicality', and we argue that this assumption is both misguided and unjustified. WAP1, however, requires no such supplementation; it directly implies that any theory that assigns a non-zero probability to our universe predicts that we will observe our universe with probability one. We argue, therefore, that WAP1 is preferable, and note that it has the benefit of avoiding the inductive overreach characteristic of much anthropic reasoning.
11.27.+d Extended classical solutions; cosmic strings, domain walls, texture
83E30 String and superstring theories (See also 81T30)
81T30 String and superstring theories; other extended objects (e.g., branes) (See also 83E30)
Issue 12 (21 June 2006)
Received 10 April 2006
Published 1 June 2006
Steven Weinstein 2006 Class. Quantum Grav. 23 4231
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